A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF TWO HEAVY SNOWFALL EVENTS AND ROAD WEATHER IMPLICATIONS IN 2018 FOR NEBRASKA by Barnhardt, Nancy
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Dissertations & Theses in Earth and Atmospheric
Sciences Earth and Atmospheric Sciences, Department of
4-2019
A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF TWO HEAVY
SNOWFALL EVENTS AND ROAD WEATHER
IMPLICATIONS IN 2018 FOR NEBRASKA
Nancy Barnhardt
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, nbarnhardt2@unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/geoscidiss
Part of the Earth Sciences Commons, and the Oceanography and Atmospheric Sciences and
Meteorology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Earth and Atmospheric Sciences, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations & Theses in Earth and Atmospheric Sciences by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Barnhardt, Nancy, "A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF TWO HEAVY SNOWFALL EVENTS AND ROAD WEATHER
IMPLICATIONS IN 2018 FOR NEBRASKA" (2019). Dissertations & Theses in Earth and Atmospheric Sciences. 115.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/geoscidiss/115
   
 
A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF TWO HEAVY SNOWFALL EVENTS 
AND ROAD WEATHER IMPLICATIONS IN 2018 FOR NEBRASKA 
 
by 
Nancy Barnhardt 
 
A THESIS 
Presented to the Faculty of  
The Graduate College of University of Nebraska 
In Partial Fulfillments of Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Science 
 
Major: Earth and Atmospheric Sciences 
 
Under the Supervision of Professor Mark R. Anderson 
 
Lincoln, Nebraska 
April, 2019 
 
 
 
A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF TWO HEAVY SNOWFALL EVENTS AND ROAD 
WEATHER IMPLICATIONS IN 2018 FOR NEBRASKA 
Nancy Barnhardt, M.S. 
University of Nebraska, 2019 
Advisor: Mark R. Anderson 
Weather-related car accidents make up approximately a quarter of all crashes even 
though the amount of time during the year in which they can occur is minimal in 
comparison to fair weather day crashes. Maintenance Decision Support Systems (MDSS) 
were developed to help mitigate the number of crashes that occur during winter weather 
through improved operations along with reducing chemical usage. An MDSS uses 
weather information to recommend road treatments based on current and future weather 
conditions. To evaluate the limitations and capabilities of the Nebraska Department of 
Transportation Maintenance Decision Support System (NDOT-MDSS), case study 
analysis was performed on two 2018 winter storms, 20-22 January and 13-15 April which 
occurred over the state of Nebraska. These storms were chosen because they produced 
heavy snowfall totals across the state and travel delays and road closures were recorded 
for both events. A comparison of the NDOT-MDSS analysis and the observations from 
archived meteorological sources for each storm was done to investigate the timing and 
the total snowfall accumulations, pavement temperatures, air temperatures, and the 
winds, highlighting both the differences and similarities between the two observation data 
sets. A synoptic analysis of both winter storms was done to understand the atmospheric 
conditions and to illustrate how the NDOT-MDSS handled each situation. Understanding 
how well the NDOT-MDSS handled each storm is a key component in helping 
 
 
maintenance crews be more efficient utilizing the maintenance recommendations. This 
research will provide the Nebraska Department of Transportation (NDOT) information 
on the NDOT-MDSS that will lead to a reduction of chemicals used to treat the roads. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
With more people on the road in recent years than ever before, the impacts of 
weather have increasing potential to impact drivers. According to the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA), weather-related crashes are defined as any crash that involves 
precipitation, fog or when there is precipitation on the roadway that causes it not to be 
dry or clear (U.S. Department of Transportation 2017). These types of crashes make up 
approximately a quarter of the total number of crashes every year. Over 7,400 people are 
killed in these crashes and another 673,000 are injured (Pisano et al. 2008). In the United 
States, 70% of the roadways receive more than 13 cm (5 in) of snow annually, the criteria 
to be considered a snowy region. With the substantial amount of roadways located in 
snowy regions, 21% of the weather-related crashes occur due to winter weather causing 
dangerous pavement conditions. During these winter-weather-related crashes, 1,300 
people are killed per year and 139,800 are injured (U.S. Department of Transportation 
2017).  
It is critical for roadways to be kept clear or drivable during and after these winter 
weather events to help prevent accidents. Unfortunately, unlimited use of resources or 
chemicals cannot ensure driver safety due to cost and environmental impacts. A 
Maintenance Decision Support System (MDSS) can be used to help road maintenance 
crews determine the best road treatment based on the weather conditions. These systems 
use the weather conditions and forecasts to provide road treatment recommendations, so 
accurate weather and road condition information is vital to have. Some of the weather 
forecasts that are provided by MDSS are precipitation types and rates, insolation values, 
wind speeds and directions, and air and dew point temperatures (Mahoney and Myers 
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2003). The Nebraska Department of Transportation (NDOT) recently implemented an 
MDSS to help cut down maintenance costs and provide weather information to 
maintenance crews.  The accuracy of the weather variables in the new NDOT-MDSS 
system in Nebraska is untested, so it is not clear how useful the system or the 
recommendations actually are for the roadways in Nebraska. NDOT maintenance crews 
are told to use the NDOT-MDSS during winter storm events; however, if the 
meteorological variables are inaccurate, then the treatment recommendations will be 
affected and this could lead to over- or under-use of materials and icy roadways. By 
understanding how accurate the meteorological variables are from the NDOT-MDSS, 
NDOT will have a better working knowledge of the limitations and capabilities of the 
system.  
This study will investigate the accuracy of total snowfall accumulation, pavement 
temperatures, air temperatures, start and end times of precipitation, and wind variables 
from the NDOT-MDSS. Two winter storms were chosen for this study: 21-23 January 
2018 and 13-15 April 2018. Both storms had major impacts on the roadways within 
Nebraska. A synoptic analysis will be completed to determine the similarities and 
differences in the weather systems to determine how the NDOT-MDSS handled them. 
This will help determine the strengths and weaknesses of the NDOT-MDSS during these 
heavy snowfall events. The main research objective is finding the limitations and 
capabilities of the NDOT-MDSS for two Colorado type low pressure systems to help 
NDOT understand how well the system works in certain storm types. 
All of the data used will provide insight into the evolution of each storm and be 
useful for understanding the path and timing each storm took. Using the characteristics of 
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each storm, data from the NDOT-MDSS will be examined to find how differences and 
similarities are handled and if there was a significant discrepancy in the forecasting 
ability or data output between each storm. Knowing how well NDOT-MDSS performed 
with each storm is important in understanding how well it will perform in the future with 
storms of similar nature. 
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Chapter 2: BACKGROUND 
2.1 Road Weather 
 Adverse weather conditions can cause both traffic speed and volume reductions. 
During heavy snow, the FHWA found that there are an average speed reductions of 
anywhere between 5%-40% and an average volume reduction of 30%-44% on highways 
(U.S. Department of Transportation 2018). During light rain or snow, there are also 
reductions of both speed and volume with speed reducing by 3%-13% and volume 
decreasing by 5%-10%. Shah et al. (2003) looked at weather impacts on traffic flow in 
Washington D.C.. Travel time data were collected in 5 minute intervals throughout the 
day without any impacts that would cause a problem for commuters such as weather. 
This was used as their “base travel time” for daily commutes. The surface hourly weather 
data used by Shah et al. were from the Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) 
network. Radar data were also used to connect the ASOS data to current conditions. The 
time that was found to be most representative of the weather impacts on traffic was the 
non-peak hours of traffic where precipitation caused travel time to increase by 11%. The 
study shows that weather events impact travel conditions, which slow down traffic 
patterns.  
Using weather information during maintenance operations can help keep the roads 
safer and keep the cost of maintenance down. Shi et al. (2009) investigated the cost 
benefits of relaying weather information, such as the forecast and current conditions, to 
maintenance crews during wintertime events and found that using the information was 
more beneficial than costly. Both free and paid weather forecast data were investigated. It 
was found that both sources of data had their pros and cons. Free weather forecast data 
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were available and were widely used by many people wanting weather information; 
however, free forecast data were less detailed and slightly less accurate. The paid forecast 
data were more accurate although, a lot of people are not willing to pay for forecasts 
when they can get them for free. It was noted that the biggest barrier preventing the use 
of weather forecast data by the winter maintenance professionals was the overall 
accuracy which goes back to if paying for the data is cost-effective. The study did come 
to the conclusion that the greatest benefit of using weather data during winter 
maintenance was the reduction in maintenance costs which means that paying for the 
more accurate data would actually save money, rather than getting the less accurate 
weather forecast data for free. 
Shi et al. (2009) conducted a series of case studies in Michigan, Iowa, and Nevada 
to decipher how weather information before and during maintenance operations affected 
maintenance costs. In every state, a positive outcome occurred in reducing maintenance 
costs by incorporating weather information into their decision-making. The potential 
causes in the reduction of costs were both the frequency the weather data and the 
accuracy of the weather source. It was noted that, accuracy is more important than 
frequency, because maintenance operators need to have accurate real time forecasts to 
help them make cost-effective decisions.  
 
2.2 Maintenance Decision Support System 
 
An MDSS is a system that uses current and forecasted weather data along with 
road surface modeling to recommend treatment options for materials or actions needed to 
treat specific roads. The development of an MDSS by the FHWA began in 2001 due to 
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the need for the integration of weather forecasts and treatment of the roads during events 
(Mahoney and Myers 2003). Five research labs were part of the development of FHWA 
MDSS: Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL), National 
Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), Massachusetts Institute of Technology-
Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) National Severe Storms Laboratory (NSSL), and NOAA Forecast Systems 
Laboratory (FSL) (Andrle et al. 2003). This MDSS was set up as a modular system with 
different individual parts. The reasoning behind the modular design was so that if 
improvements needed to be made, individual parts could be improved without changing 
the entire system (Mahoney and Myers 2003). 
Mahoney and Myers (2003) noted that there were a few different components that 
were implemented into MDSS. One of the main modular components is the Road 
Weather Forecast System (RWFS) This component of MDSS uses data from various 
sources such as the National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) mesoscale 
models, Road Weather Information System (RWIS), and ASOS. The RWFS takes in the 
weather data from the various NCEP models and ASOS stations to give current 
conditions and forecasts.  
The Road Condition and Treatment Module (RCTM) determines the road 
conditions which include road temperature and snow coverage and appropriate treatments 
for each segment of the road system. Hallowell and Blaisdell (2003) explained that the 
RCTM in an MDSS functional prototype used a land-surface model known as 
SNTHERM-RT to retrieve temperatures for the road surface and subsurface. The RCTM 
is also the module in MDSS where weather variables and road conditions are integrated 
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to get the chemical recommendations for road segments. The module is responsible for 
the updates in road conditions after a treatment has been applied. The RCTM has a set 
snow-to-liquid equivalent ratio (SLR) of 10:1 for every event that occurs. The set SLR in 
MDSS makes the model easier to set up and for winter storms to be more generalized in 
terms of predicted snowfall. However, within an individual storm, the SLR can vary as 
the storm progresses due to varying temperatures as well as varying liquid water contents. 
SLR is influenced by the measure of air that is captured in the gaps within the ice crystals 
of the snow, lower-level temperatures, and the surrounding environment. Changes in 
these factors will lead to SLRs different from the mean SLR of 10:1 (Baxter et al. 2005). 
Since MDSS uses a mean SLR, the forecasted and observed amounts could be flawed due 
to potential inconsistencies depending on location and weather conditions. The pavement 
model that is in use inputs the thermal properties of the road into the system, which then 
determines the amount of compaction and melting taking place.  
All of these components and modules make up the complex system of an MDSS. 
Without one part, the data flow would be interrupted and the integration of the 
meteorological variables, road weather conditions, or recommendations would be 
unattainable. Issues with any of the components might affect other components in an 
MDSS which could cause inconsistencies or errors in the analyses that are being put into 
the system. 
The Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) was one of the states chosen to 
implement an MDSS when it was still a prototype (Andrle et al. 2003). Evaluations of the 
different parts of MDSS took place including the weather forecasting tools, the different 
treatment recommendations that were given, and the potential benefits and limitations of 
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the system. Fifteen test routes were selected in the Ames and Des Moines, IA vicinities. 
The evaluations occurred between 3 February-7 April 2003. During this time period, 
there were three heavy snow events, five light snow events and one mixed precipitation 
event. There were various weather data sources, real-time and archived, which were used 
to verify MDSS weather data during these nine events. The recommendations given by 
IDOT after the evaluations were completed, showed the accuracy of the weather 
forecasts, especially the timing of the event, needed improvement and MDSS display and 
data collection portion were both difficult to use.  
One of the main areas of focus during the development of MDSS was to increase 
the benefits or the savings for maintenance operations during winter weather events by 
reducing chemical usage (Mahoney and Myers 2003). Up to 33% of state highway 
budgets are used in winter road maintenance during snow and ice events even though 
these events occur very rarely throughout the year (Hanbali 1994). With new technology 
and more accurate weather forecasts, maintenance crews can become more proactive than 
reactive when it comes to applying chemicals to treat the roads. Treating roads earlier 
may help weaken the bond that snow or ice forms with the roadway. With the bond being 
weaker, there is less of a need to use chemicals to clear the roadways which leads to 
lower maintenance costs and less human power hours needed during an event (Shi 2009). 
MDSS recommends various solid and liquid road treatments during winter events.  
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2.3 Road Chemicals 
 
Having an accurate forecast prior to a storm is vital to maintenance crews to better 
help treat the roads. Keeping the roads clear during the winter besides plowing involves 
many different materials including anti-icing and deicing materials (NDOR 2010). Anti-
icing materials are a preventative measure taken by maintenance crews and are applied 
before or at the onset of the winter precipitation. The purpose of putting these chemicals 
down before the event is to help prevent the bond between snow or ice and the road 
surface. Having current weather conditions along with accurate forecasts is critical in the 
application of anti-icers because they rely so much on the timing of events. If the forecast 
is incorrect about the timing and onset of an event, anti-icing materials may be wasted by 
applying them too early or not applying them early enough. In some states, such as 
Virginia, anti-icing chemicals are only applied on roads with high levels of service 
because it has to be applied so early on in the maintenance process (Roosevelt 1997). 
Liquid chemicals are much more effective than solids, for anti-icing. When applying 
these chemicals, it is also important to look at the temperatures because different 
chemicals can be used for colder, below freezing temperatures (Table 2.1). A eutectic 
mixture, is a mixture where the combination of substances has a lower freezing point than 
any of the individual components. The eutectic temperature is the temperature where a 
eutectic mixture freezes (Ketcham et al. 1996). The eutectic temperature is not equivalent 
to the effective temperature of a material. The effective temperature of a material is the 
temperature at which that material freezes, and is no longer useful because it does not 
have any melting effect on snow or ice. An important aspect of anti-icing is that when  
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Table 2.1: Eutectic Temperatures for Commonly Used Anti-icing and Deicing Materials 
(Ketcham et al. 1996, Fischel 2001) 
 
Anti-icing/Deicing 
Material 
Eutectic 
Temperature 
Effective 
Temperature 
Sodium Chloride -21.0 °C (-6 °F)   -9.0 °C (16 °F) 
Calcium Chloride -51.0 °C (-60 °F) -32.0 °C (-26 °F) 
Magnesium Chloride -33.0 °C (-28 °F) -32.0 °C (-26 °F) 
Potassium Acetate -60.0 °C (-76 °F) -26.0 °C (-15 °F) 
Calcium Magnesium 
Acetate 
-27.5 °C (-17.7 °F)   -7.0 °C (20 °F) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
used correctly, anti-icers can decrease the overall uses of chemicals throughout an event 
which will decrease costs of maintenance (Shi et al. 2009). 
Deicing chemicals are applied to areas of the road that already have accumulation 
of snow or ice. This may occur at any point after the beginning of the event. The purpose 
of deicers is to penetrate the accumulated snow or ice to weaken or break the bond it has 
with the road. Weakening the bond will make plowing the snow or even displacing by 
traffic much easier. Some examples of commonly used deicers used by maintenance 
crews are calcium chloride, sodium chloride, potassium acetate, and calcium magnesium 
acetate, which are very similar to the popular anti-icing materials (Fischel 2001).  
Solid ice control materials, such as sand and gravel, have various uses such as 
increasing traction for vehicles and preventing and removing ice and snow. Aggregates 
and abrasives are placed on the road surface before and during the storm. They are pre-
wet before being applied to help them stick to the road more efficiently (Albers and Tuan 
2015). Pre-wetting is also done for deicing materials. Aggregates should be put down on 
problem areas where sliding occurs more easily such as curves and places where stopping 
quickly may become an issue such as intersections. Sand and gravel are also used when 
deicing materials become ineffective due to extremely low temperatures. 
 
2.4 Mid Latitude Cyclones/Colorado Lows 
 
Mid-latitude cyclones usually bring in a wide variety of weather conditions, 
including snowfall in the winter. The snowfall can often be heavy in areas, causing poor 
road conditions. Understanding the development and conditions that accompany these 
systems can help road maintenance crews better prepare for an event. There are various 
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locations that mid-latitude cyclones can form; however, the focus area for this study is 
over eastern Colorado since these events influence the weather over Nebraska. 
 A typical environment prior to the development of a cyclone is warm, moist air to 
the southeast, warmer, drier air to the west of the mountains, and colder, drier air is 
usually located to the north. The warm moist air to the southeast helps to provide a 
moisture source for the system. The cold, dry air from the north advects southward and 
the warmer air advects northward which produces fronts, a necessary situation with the 
development of a mid-latitude cyclone. Intensification is caused by the tightening of the 
pressure gradient and when divergence aloft surpasses the convergence at the surface. 
The tightening of the pressure gradient causes stronger winds which can advect more 
moisture and temperature. The additional advection can cause heavier precipitation to 
occur. Once the cyclone has reached the occlusion stage of development, it is mostly or 
fully matured. As the storm occludes, the warm sector shrinks and the energy for the 
storm dissipates, causing its demise. Cold air then fully overtakes the warm air and 
stabilizes the surface (Lackmann 2015). 
Colorado Lows, or lee-side cyclones, are known for a wide variety of weather as 
well as their intensity. These systems can potentially lead to severe storms along the 
southern portion of the cold front and snow, rain, sleet or freezing rain in the warm 
sector, depending on temperatures. In addition, if ample moisture is present, heavy 
precipitation can fall. In the wintertime with appropriate temperatures, the northwestern 
part of Colorado Lows can produce snow with blizzard conditions possible. The National 
Weather Service (NWS) criteria for a storm to be a blizzard is a minimum of 3 hours of 
winds over 15.6 m s-1 (30.4 kts) and 0.22 km (¼ mile) of visibility. There are three 
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meteorological ingredients that are needed to produce blizzard conditions: cold air, 
moisture and warm, rising air. A Colorado low pressure system follows the structure and 
development of a classic Norwegian mid-latitude cyclone. Some of the characteristics are 
its distinctive comma cloud shape and how the low forms along frontal boundaries. 
Carlson (1980) noted that the comma cloud shape is potentially caused by an occluded 
front when the storm is mature. This is the first step in the dissipation of the storm. Mid-
latitude cyclones usually take place at latitudes between 35°-55° N (Ferreira et al. 2013). 
The approximate size of a mid-latitude cyclone is 1500-5000 km in diameter, which 
surpasses the size of a smaller tropical cyclone (200-1000 km). One of the main purposes 
of mid-latitude cyclones is global heat transport. In a mid-latitude cyclone, the counter-
clockwise rotation allows warmer air to be advected northward and colder air to be 
advected southward. The warmer air rises over the colder air, causing upward motion 
which will help deepen the low pressure system.  
 Prior to the development of a mid-latitude cyclone, an upper level shortwave 
usually forms, which also represents instability. Shortwaves at 500 hPa surfaces, which 
are also known as upper level disturbances, are usually embedded within long waves. 
Shortwaves are able to move at a faster speed than long waves and usually are associated 
with areas of precipitation. In the winter season, locations to the northwest of the surface 
low typically observe frozen precipitation. Shortwaves are a very important part of the 
development of a cyclone because it helps initiate the counter-clockwise rotation through 
cold air and warm air advections in the trough. Stronger advections of moisture and 
temperature intensify the storm. Another important ingredient for cyclones are jet streaks. 
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Jet streaks have areas of divergence in their left exit region and their right entrance region 
(Ahrens and Samson 2011).  
 Determining where the rain/snow line will be in a Colorado cyclone can be 
difficult at times. The meteorological variable known as thickness refers to the vertical 
distance between two pressure levels. The thickness can be used as a way to tell the mean 
layer temperature (Venne et al. 1997). The critical thickness of a layer helps identify 
where the rain-snow line will occur. In winter weather forecasting, critical thicknesses are 
used to help the forecaster determine the type of precipitation that is going to fall at a 
given time and location. There are various critical thickness lines within the atmosphere 
for different layers (Table 2.2). These critical thicknesses are “rules-of-thumb” that 
indicate where the thickness of a layer corresponds to an appropriate mean layer 
temperature of 0 °C. Layers with mean temperatures above 0 °C allow for melting of the 
ice crystals. Melting will lead to different types of precipitation such as sleet, freezing 
rain, or rain. Critical thicknesses are not always an accurate measure though, especially at 
higher elevations. The critical thickness of a layer also may not always represent the rain-
snow line at areas that are at sea level because of the potential for shallow layers of warm 
air that are near the surface.  
Varying temperatures and saturation of a dendritic growth zone (DGZ) will cause 
different shapes and sizes of snowflakes to form. A DGZ is a saturated section of the 
atmosphere that has temperatures ranging from -12 °C to -18 °C where dendritic crystals 
are formed. Different temperatures and saturation ratios will mean that the ice crystals 
can form into shapes such as needles which include pyramids, bullets, and columns or 
plates which include dendrites, stellar crystals, sectored hexagons, and hexagonal 
15 
 
Table 2.2: Critical thickness values used to determine where the rain-snow line is located 
and their corresponding thickness layers (Venne et al. 1997). 
 
Thickness (hPa) Critical Thickness (m) 
1000-850 1300 
1000-700 2840 
1000-500 5400 
850-700 1540 
850-500 4100 
700-500 2560 
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plates. Temperatures between -10 °C and -20 °C will form a variety of plate shapes 
depending on the saturation of the atmosphere. Needle-shaped ice crystals are more likely 
to form when there is lower saturation excess (Curry and Webster 1999). When looking 
at the atmospheric profile during a winter event, it is important to determine whether the 
DGZ is mostly or completely saturated. If any part of the temperature profile exceeds 
0 °C (32 °F), this can lead to other types of precipitation such as sleet or freezing rain due 
to melting.  
Atmospheric moisture is also important to the development and overall 
precipitation patterns of a mid-latitude cyclone. Precipitable water is the total amount of 
water in a column of air if all the water in that column fell as rain over an area. It is an 
indicator of places where greater amounts of precipitation may fall. Areas where snow is 
falling, usually to the northwest of the low pressure center, do not have as much 
precipitable water as areas where heavy rain is falling, which is usually along the cold 
front.  
Another component of the atmosphere that is important in the forecasting of mid-
latitude cyclones is the change in slope of a temperature gradient between levels. If there 
is an increase in the horizontal temperature gradient over time, this indicates that 
frontogenesis is occurring (Sawyer 1956). Two processes that are major contributors of 
frontogenesis are divergence and deformation. These processes are significant 
contributors to the overall formation of winter storms as well. Frontogenesis can occur 
between 850 hPa and 500 hPa and can take place during the developing or mature stages 
of a mid-latitude cyclone. One of the areas of snowfall is commonly located is on the 
northwestern side of the storm where the deformation zone is located. The deformation 
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zone is produced by frontogenesis. In addition to frontogenesis, equivalent potential 
vorticity in term of the geopotential wind (EPVg*) is another important ingredient in 
producing heavy snow. Evans and Jurewicz Sr. (2009) found that there is a correlation 
between the heaviest snowfall accumulation and the minimum value along with the depth 
and persistence of negative EPVg*. The findings show that the lowest values of EPVg* 
were present just before the start of the heaviest snowfall of the event. Another 
correlation that was found in the same study was between depth and persistence of rising 
motion less than -8 μb s-1. The correlation usually occurs in the dendrite zone and where 
the maximum snowfall fell. Understanding how the various ingredients within a lee side 
cyclone are important in finding areas where heavy snow can fall which will be beneficial 
for a synoptic analysis of a major winter storm. 
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Chapter 3: DATA AND METHODS 
 
NDOT divides the state of Nebraska into eight different maintenance districts 
(Figure 3.1). In the NDOT-MDSS, each NDOT road within a district is partitioned into 
individual road segments or “routes”. To determine how the NDOT-MDSS varies across 
a district or regions within the state, several routes have been chosen to be investigated. 
The routes were selected by location and from discussions with NDOT. Routes within 
each district were chosen to best represent that district based on the proximity to ASOS, 
RWIS stations, and roadside cameras and the route cardinal orientation (e.g., north/south 
or east/west directions). While choosing these routes, the type of road (i.e., 2-lane or 4-
lane) was also taken into consideration to make sure that there are variations in the level 
of service (LOS) determined by NDOT (Table 3.1). The LOS is based on a daily average 
traffic flow, as well as the amount of time it should take each route to regain bare 
pavement after a snow event (NDOR 2010).   
 Two storms were chosen for the case study analysis: 21-23 January 2018 and 13-
15 April 2018. These storms were chosen because blizzard conditions occurred 
throughout the state and had major impacts on travel, including many road closures. Both 
of the storms would be classified as Colorado lows. The storms are very similar in terms 
of strength and snowfall. Eight routes (Table 3.2, Figure 3.2) were chosen in total 
representing Districts 3, 6, and 8 based on the impacts of the storms. The NDOT-MDSS 
data for both archived storms were extracted from the web interface of NDOT-MDSS 
(2018). Since the NDOT-MDSS archive is a proprietary entity, control of the data within 
the archive is not set by the author and may limit analyses with the case studies. Three-  
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Figure 3.1: County Warning Areas for NWS Weather Forecast Offices serving Nebraska overlaid 
onto the 8 NDOT maintenance divisions (Adapted from NDOT 2019).  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: NDOT level of service for different road types. (NDOR, 2010) 
 
Route Designation 
Traffic level 
(Average Daily 
Traffic Count) 
Regain time 
(bare lane) 
(hrs) 
Super Commuter >50,000 4 
Urban Commuter 20,000-50,000 6 
Rural Commuter 7,000-20,000 8 
Primary 2,500-7,000 12 
Secondary 1,000-2,500 24 
Low Volume <1,000 48 
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Table 3.2: Selected Test Routes from the NDOT-MDSS 
Route District Route Description Route Cardinal 
Orientation 
Daily 
Traffic 
Count 
RWIS 
site 
ASOS 
site 
1 3 330-US 81 Jct. 275 
to Jct. 91 at 
Humphrey  RP 
133.28-158.42 
North-South 8425 Scribner KLCG 
2 3 340-US 75, from Jct. 
77 at Winnebago to 
Jct. 129 just south of 
south Sioux City RP 
168.76-184.87 
North-South 7875 Scribner KLCG 
3 3 350-NE 35, Wayne 
West to Jct. 35&98, 
MP 29.69 to MP 
21.68 
East-West 4415 Scribner  KLCG 
4 6 620-US 30 North 
Platte to Brady East-West 1630 Wellfleet KLBF 
5 6 620-I-80 North 
Platte to Brady East-West 15420 Wellfleet KLBF 
6 6 650-US83, Dismal 
River to Thedford North-South  418 
North 
Thedford KANW 
7 8 810-N12, N Jct. US 
183 to N Jct. NE 
137 
East-West  230 North Thedford KANW 
8 3 310-Hwy 56, 
Greeley/Boone Co. 
Line to Jct. 56&14 
East-West  615 Cedar Rapids KBVN 
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hourly increments were chosen for each storm, starting from the beginning of the saved 
storm within the NDOT-MDSS system, which is up to 24 hours prior to the onset of the 
storm, to the end of the precipitation for that route. Images of the analysis of the 
conditions for every route provided by NDOT-MDSS were also taken at three-hourly 
increments to show how the storm progressed as well as how well the system identified 
heavy precipitation and the location of the rain-snow line. The placement of the rain-
snow line within the NDOT-MDSS will be compared to known critical thicknesses of 
different layers in the atmosphere. In addition, the surface freezing level from ASOS 
observations will be used to determine variations within NDOT-MDSS. 
Two of the routes, Routes 4 and 5 (Figure 3.3), were selected because they run 
parallel to each other as well as their close proximity to each other (< 4 km). A 
comparison will be done between these two routes within NDOT-MDSS to see how their 
snowfall accumulations and start and end times varied from one another. This will show 
if any major deviations occurred in the forecasts for locations that are in the same area. If 
there are differences, reasons explaining them will be investigated. Routes that have 
different route cardinal orientation will also be investigated to identify any differences in 
treatment or NDOT-MDSS’s forecast ability.  
To help determine the accuracy of the NDOT-MDSS forecasts, the start and end 
times of the precipitation for each route were determined in three separate ways. First, the 
precipitation start and end times from the NDOT-MDSS forecast are found. Then, the 
start and end times are obtained from the analysis within NDOT-MDSS. Finally the start 
and end times of precipitation are determined from local NWS radar data. The radar data 
are considered independent observations to the NDOT-MDSS, even though the  
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Figure 3.3: Location of Routes 4 and 5 in respect to each other and to the KLBF ASOS 
station 
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NDOT-MDSS could be incorporating radar data. The forecasted precipitation 
start and end times were taken 6 hours prior to the NDOT-MDSS analysis of the start and 
end times because maintenance crews need to know approximately 6 hours before the 
storm starts or ends to be able to put down chemicals, if necessary. The differences in 
start and end times of precipitation can be used as a verification for the efficiency of the 
NDOT-MDSS as both a forecasting and analysis tool. When the forecasted start time is 
different from the analysis of the start time within the NDOT-MDSS, the positive 
(negative) values indicate that the forecasted start time was later (earlier) than the 
analysis of the start time.  Positive (negative) values also indicate that the NDOT-MDSS 
forecasted or analysis values start later (earlier) than the radar observed values. Western 
routes have shorter forecast lead times due to the way NDOT archives data within 
NDOT-MDSS. Storms are saved for each event when the storm starts to impact western 
Nebraska. Generally, there is less than 24 hours of lead time in the western part of the 
state before the occurrence of precipitation. Eastern Nebraska has longer lead times than 
western Nebraska by 20 hours in the April storm and 30 hours in the January storm.  
Similarly, total forecasted snow accumulation can be taken from within the            
NDOT-MDSS and compared to independent snow totals for each storm to determine 
similarities or differences in forecasts. The independent snow totals are comprised of 
individual observations from xmACIS (2019) which include observations from the 
Weather Bureau Army Navy (WBAN), Cooperative Observer (CO-OP) and the 
Community Collaborative Rain, Hail and Snow Network (CoCoRaHS). The highest total 
snow accumulation within the NDOT-MDSS during the storm will be used because the 
system accounts for compaction, melt and treatments applied as the storm impacts the 
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route. Compaction, melt and treatment application on the roads have the potential to lead 
to lower snow totals than what might actually have occurred. Comparisons of the total 
snowfall accumulations of xmACIS and the NDOT-MDSS will be completed. The 
comparison will serve as a verification for the accuracy and limitations of the NDOT-
MDSS. Hourly wind and temperature analyses will be taken from the NDOT-MDSS and 
various ASOS stations (Plymouth State University 2019) located near the selected routes 
for comparison. The temperature analysis in the NDOT-MDSS is assumed to be 2 m 
temperatures. Hourly pavement temperature analyses will be taken from the NDOT-
MDSS and various RWIS stations (WebMDSS™ 2018). Each route will be grouped 
based on their geographic location in respect to ASOS and RWIS stations (Figure 3.2). 
The temperatures obtained from the RWIS and ASOS stations in each geographic group 
will be compared to see how much they differ. Large differences could potentially 
indicate that there may also be a problem with the pavement temperature being reported 
and input into the NDOT-MDSS which may lead to issues with snowfall total 
accumulations and snow rates. The proximity of the routes to the ASOS station varies in 
the geographic locations so that may limit the accuracy of the data (Table 3.3). The 
geography of the routes were very similar to the geography of the area that the ASOS 
stations were located in. In general, they were both flat with minimal trees so to this will 
cut down on possibly differences, especially with the wind analysis. 
A synoptic analysis will be done for each winter storm to identify key weather 
conditions associated with each event. The two storms will be compared and contrasted 
based on their meteorological characteristics. For this analysis, surface conditions, 
850 hPa, 700 hPa, 500 hPa and 300 hPa upper air level data, along with radar  
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Table 3.3: Approximate Distance of each route to their respective ASOS station 
Route Approximate Distance from 
ASOS station 
1 50.0 km 
2 41.0 km 
3 3.1 km 
4 0.5 km 
5 2.9 km 
6 85.0 km 
7 50.0 km 
8 8.0 km 
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data will be used to describe the meteorological characteristics. Surface and upper air 
conditions will be acquired from the Storm Prediction Center (SPC) archive (SPC 2019). 
The radar imagery were obtained from NCAR (2018) and the SPC (2019). Radar images 
will also be used for verification of the start and end times of precipitation from each 
storm based on the route location. Upper air soundings from the archive at Plymouth 
State (2018) were obtained to show where the dendritic growth zone (DGZ) is located in 
the atmospheric column to determine snowfall characteristics. In addition, other aspects 
of the storm will be investigated using data and charts from SPC (2019), such as 
frontogenesis, EVPg*, vorticity, rising motion, precipitable water and divergence aloft. 
The forecasted precipitation probabilities and the predicted location of the low 
pressure center for each of the storms were collected from WPC (2019). The low pressure 
tracks indicate the shifts that the forecast takes in days 7 through 3 prior to the event over 
Nebraska. The forecast tracks also show where there is a higher chance of precipitation. 
In addition, the forecasts tracks will be used as a visual aid to help understand the 
decisions made by the NWS in their forecasts.  
The routes are located in 3 different NWS county warning areas (CWA): Sioux 
Falls, Omaha/Valley, and North Platte (Figure 3.1). Routes 1, 3, and 8 are in the CWA of 
the Omaha/Valley NWS office, Routes 4, 5, 6, and 7 are in the CWA of the North Platte 
NWS office, and Route 2 is the CWA of the Sioux Falls NWS. The Area Forecast 
Discussions (AFD), advisories, warnings and watches produced by the NWS were 
obtained from Iowa State University (2019). The products will be compiled to show how 
the NWS forecasts developed over time along with snow total predictions for each CWA. 
NWS Hastings was included due to their proximity to Route 8. Knowing the forecasts for 
28 
 
the storms will provide insight into how well the models did in addition to the how the 
forecasts evolved alongside the forecasted location of the low.  
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Chapter 4: RESULTS 
4.1 January Synoptic Results 
The development of the January storm system began with a low pressure system 
that formed over southeastern Colorado. The system brought clouds and precipitation to 
the west coast then strengthened as it crossed the Rocky Mountains. The storm system 
took advantage of strong moisture advection from the Gulf of Mexico which aided in the 
development of rising motion. The large amount of moisture combined with the rising 
motion produced high amounts of wet snow throughout the central Great Plains, which 
commonly occurs with Colorado Lows. Strong to severe thunderstorms also occurred 
along the cold front in the Mississippi Valley. The effects of the storm in Nebraska 
started at 0000 UTC 21 January in the far western parts of the state. The storm had not 
fully matured, so areas in the western part of the state did not receive as much snow as 
the central and eastern parts of Nebraska. As the low moved into Kansas from 
southeastern Colorado, the low strengthened and areas in Nebraska to the northwest of 
the low received upwards of 25.4-30.48cm (10-12 in) of snow (Figure 4.1). Drifting 
caused road closures on both state and county roads (U.S. Department of Commerce 
2018a).  
At 0000 UTC 22 January, the North Platte, NE atmospheric sounding (Figure 4.2) 
showed that the atmosphere has the necessary ingredients to produce snowfall. There is 
saturation in the DGZ, which is located between 650 hPa and 550 hPa. There is also no 
melting taking place in this temperature profile due to the fact the temperature never goes 
above 0 °C (32 °F). The ASOS station located at KLBF in North Platte was reporting 
heavy snow at this time. At 0000 UTC 22 January, the NWS Omaha/Valley atmospheric  
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Figure 4.1: Snowfall totals throughout the state of Nebraska from the NWS for the January storm (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 2018a) 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Profile of the atmosphere at 0000 UTC 22 January for North Platte, Nebraska (Plymouth State 
Archive 2019) 
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sounding (Figure 4.3) is showing complete saturation from 950-775 hPa. The 
temperatures in that part of the atmosphere are above 0 °C until 790 hPa. The DGZ is 
located between 600 hPa and 500 hPa and is not quite fully saturated; however, there is a 
pocket of dry air below the DGZ so any ice crystals that do form and fall will most likely 
sublimate or melt before reaching the surface. The ASOS station located at KOAX in 
Omaha is reporting haze. As the storm moves to the east, the North Platte atmospheric 
sounding at 1200 UTC 22 January (Figure 4.4) still shows that the atmosphere is mostly 
saturated and that the temperatures do not exceed 0 °C so the ingredients for snow are 
still present. Light snow was reported by the North Platte ASOS station. The Omaha 
atmospheric sounding at 1200 UTC 22 January 2018 (Figure 4.5), indicates that the 
temperatures never exceed 0 °C (32 °F) throughout the sounding. Even though there is an 
inversion from 850 hPa-750 hPa, the temperature never reaches above freezing, which 
implies that there was no melt of the ice crystals on the way to the surface. The DGZ is 
located between 650 hPa-550 hPa and is almost completely saturated which allows for 
the excellent dendrite ice crystal growth. The sounding can be compared with radar 
observations to show that precipitation was falling at 1225 UTC over eastern Nebraska 
(Figure 4.6). Since the temperatures in the sounding were all below freezing, snowfall 
can be considered the precipitation type. The saturated atmosphere also means that the 
precipitation can be tracked back to the DGZ. The Omaha ASOS station was reporting 
light rain at 1200 UTC. The light rain turned over to snow within 30 minutes of 1200 
UTC. 
Two days before Nebraska will feel any impacts from the storm at 0000 UTC 20 
January, a shortwave at 500 hPa is found over northern California (Figure 4.7). By  
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Figure 4.3: Profile of the atmosphere at 0000 UTC 22 January 2018 for Omaha, Nebraska (Plymouth State 
Archive 2019) 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Profile of the atmosphere at 1200 UTC 22 January for North Platte, Nebraska (Plymouth State 
Archive 2019) 
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Figure 4.5: Profile of the atmosphere at 1200 UTC 22 January 2018 for Omaha, Nebraska (Plymouth State 
Archive 2019) 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Radar image at 1200 UTC 22 January 2018 (NCAR 2018) 
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Figure 4.7: Different levels in the atmosphere at 0000 UTC 20 January 2018. a) 850 hPa b) 700 hPa. c) 500 
hPa d) 300 hPa (SPC 2019) 
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1200 UTC 20 January (Figure 4.8), the 500 hPa shortwave moves southward to southern 
California where a closed low starts to develop. The 500 hPa trough is positively tilted, 
which is usually known as a building phase of a trough. The positive tilt of 500 hPa 
trough proceeds the neutral phase where the trough usually is completely vertical. At 
1200 UTC 21 January (Figure 4.9), the 500 hPa trough closes off and a closed low is 
found over the Four Corners area. When the closed low forms, the system really starts to 
deepen. The system is intensifying and the height gradient is decreasing which leads to 
stronger winds throughout the area. Winds reaching 36 m s-1 (70 kts) were observed to 
the southeast of the closed low at 500 hPa. Twenty four hours later, at 1200 UTC 22 
January, the trough has matured and is now neutrally tilted over the Great Plains and 
most of the central United States (Figure 4.10). The closed low is noticeably stronger and 
the impacts from the low are stronger winds and heavy precipitation which are being felt 
across Nebraska. Cold air advection (CAA) can be seen at 850 hPa (Figure 4.10a) to the 
northwest and west side of the low pressure center. The CAA stretches from North 
Dakota all the way down to Texas. CAA helps bring in the cold air necessary for 
producing snowfall as the dominant precipitation type. The low pressure center is in 
northeastern Kansas, shown by the circulation occurring at the surface at 0013 UTC 22 
January (Figure 4.11).  
At 1200 UTC 21 January, most of the critical thicknesses are still located to the 
north of eastern Nebraska though the western part of Nebraska would indicate snow 
(Figure 4.12). This indicates with moderate accuracy that if any precipitation is falling in 
central or eastern Nebraska, then it will most likely be rain. The NDOT-MDSS is 
showing that there is snow falling in northwestern Nebraska and a combination of rain  
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Figure 4.8: Different levels in the atmosphere at 1200 UTC 20 January 2018. a) 850 hPa. b) 700 hPa c) 500 
hPa d) 300 hPa (SPC 2019) 
 
37 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Different levels in the atmosphere at 1200 UTC 21 January 2018. a) 850 hPa b) 700 hPa c) 500 
hPa d) 300 hPa (SPC 2019) 
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Figure 4.10: Different levels in the atmosphere at 1200 UTC 22 January 2018. a) 850 hPa b) 700 hPa 
c) 500 hPa d) 300 hPa (SPC 2019) 
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Figure 4.11: Surface observations at 0013 UTC 22 January 2018 for the Great Plains (SPC 2019) 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Critical thickness lines at 1200 UTC 21 January across 1000-500 hPa (red), 1000-700 hPa 
(green), 1000-850 hPa (blue), 850-700 hPa (yellow) and the surface 0° temperature (magenta) (SPC 2019). 
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and freezing rain is falling throughout southern Nebraska (Figure 4.13). Alliance airport 
ASOS station (KAIA) in northwestern Nebraska was reporting snow at 1200 UTC 21 
January while McCook airport ASOS station (KMCK) in southwestern Nebraska was 
only reporting cloud cover. As the storm’s effects move through Nebraska, the 
precipitable water content at 1800 UTC 21 January falls between 0.76-1.5 cm (0.3-0.6 in) 
in Nebraska (Figure 4.14). With this amount of moisture in the atmosphere, snow 
production is very possible if all other ingredients are present. According to the NDOT-
MDSS, snow is falling in western Nebraska while rain is falling in eastern Nebraska 
(Figure 4.15). At 0000 UTC 22 January, the highest values of vorticity (Figure 4.16) are 
concentrated over western Kansas and stretch down through the panhandle of Texas. 
Vorticity values are reaching upwards of 30 x10-5 s-1 in the area over western Kansas. At 
this time, the 850 hPa trough is extending from New Mexico through South Dakota with 
areas of rising motion over southwestern Nebraska, northeastern Colorado and 
northwestern Kansas (Figure 4.17).  
At 0700 UTC 22 January at 300 hPa, there was a trough extending through most 
of the West and Midwest states with the jet streak positioned over eastern Nebraska down 
to Texas (Figure 4.18). The left exit region and the right entrance region of a jet streak is 
where the divergence in the upper levels occur. The rising motion is found in both of 
these areas, which is to be expected since rising motion is necessary for divergence aloft. 
There are large regions of divergence over eastern Nebraska and along the Mississippi 
Valley (Figure 4.18) where the cold front is located (Figure 4.19). Another source of 
divergence aloft is associated with positive vorticity, because positive vorticity aids rising 
motion. At 1200 UTC 22 January at 500 hPa (Figure 4.20), there is a region of  
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Figure 4.14: Precipitable water in the lowest 400 hPa at 1800 UTC 21 January (SPC 2019) 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Analysis of conditions at 1800 UTC 21 January (Colors correspond to legend in Figure 4.13) 
(WebMDSS™ 2018) 
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Figure 4.16: Vorticity and height at 500 hPa at 0000 UTC 22 January (SPC 2019) 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Average omega (850hPa) overlaid on the jet stream (300hPa) at 0000 UTC 22 January (SPC 
2019) 
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Figure 4.18: Average omega (850hPa) overlaid on the jet stream (300hPa) at 0700 UTC 22 January (SPC 
2019) 
 
 
Figure 4.19: Satellite surface map of the United States at 0730 UTC 22 January (Unisys 2018) 
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Figure 4.20: Vorticity and height at 500 hPa at 1200 UTC 22 January (SPC 2019) 
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high positive vorticity centered in the middle of the low pressure. There is another region 
to the east that spans over western Missouri and eastern Kansas. Rising motion is also 
caused when there is horizontal convergence at the surface, generating vertical stretching 
fostering greater rotation. The greater rotation leads to higher positive vorticity and 
divergence aloft. Without rising motion, the storm would dissipate. The centrally located 
area of positive vorticity has values reaching over 3.3 x 10-6 s-1 which indicates a strong 
mid-latitude cyclone. In addition, a large concentration of rising motion is also due to 
warm air rising over colder air, increasing the risk for severe weather. As the impacts of 
the storm lessening over Nebraska around 0000 UTC 23 January, the highest values of 
vorticity are now located over Missouri and southeastern Iowa (Figure 4.21). The areas of 
rising motion have also shifted eastward at this time with the jet streak now located over 
the southeastern United States (Figure 4.22).  
The critical thicknesses have shifted southward from the previous location at 
1200 UTC 21 January and are now located in central Nebraska. The critical thicknesses 
are not quite aligned at 2000 UTC 21 January (Figure 4.23) which means that some of the 
thicknesses would indicate snow in some areas while other areas might receive other 
forms of precipitation. The placement of the critical thicknesses indicate that the lower 
levels of the atmosphere are warmer than the upper levels. At 2000 UTC 21 January, 
snow was occurring in western Nebraska, freezing rain was occurring in central 
Nebraska, and rain in eastern Nebraska. The NDOT-MDSS shows each of these 
precipitation types (Figure 4.24) falling at 2000 UTC 21 January in specific locations 
relating to the critical thickness lines. Freezing rain was not indicated on the atmospheric 
soundings at either NWS North Platte or NWS Omaha/Valley at either 0000 UTC or  
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Figure 4.21: Vorticity and height at 500 hPa at 0000 UTC 23 January (SPC 2019) 
 
 
Figure 4.22: Average omega (850hPa) overlaid on the jet stream (300hPa) at 0000 UTC 23 January 
(SPC 2019) 
 
48 
 
 
 
Figure 4.23: Critical thickness lines at 2000 UTC 21 January across 1000-500 hPa (red), 1000-700 hPa 
(green), 1000-850 hPa (blue), 850-700 hPa (yellow) and the surface 0° temperature (magenta) (SPC 2019). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.24: Analysis of conditions at 2000 UTC 21 January from the NDOT-MDSS (Colors correspond to 
legend in Figure 4.13) (WebMDSS™ 2018) 
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1200 UTC 22 January (Figures 4.2-4.5); however, the timing of the soundings differ 
slightly from when the freezing rain occurred so freezing rain was not present at the time 
in these locations. 
At 1800 UTC 22 January (Figure 4.25), most of the critical thickness values have 
moved southward into the south-central part of the United States. Most of central and 
eastern Nebraska should be seeing snow at 1800 UTC 22 January as indicated by the 
NDOT-MDSS (Figure 4.26). The NDOT-MDSS shows the precipitation stopping in the 
western and central part of the state while the far southeastern parts of the state are still 
seeing rain at 1800 UTC 22 January. Above freezing surface temperatures and a portion 
of the 1000-850 hPa critical thickness line indicating the thickness of the layer is 1300 m 
is hovering over the area where rain was falling according to the NDOT-MDSS. The 
freezing levels (Figure 4.27) at 1800 UTC 22 January show that it is in approximately the 
same area that both the NDOT-MDSS map showing the analysis of the conditions and the 
critical thickness are. Each of these variables serve as a verification for the other as well 
as what NDOT-MDSS outputs.  
At 0300 UTC 22 January (Figure 4.28), there is a range of .76-1.78 cm 
(0.3-0.7 in) of precipitable water in the lowest 400 hPa across Nebraska which can 
produce a good amount of snowfall, depending on the SLRs. The cold front spans from 
Missouri to the Louisiana-Texas border and has precipitable values of over 2.54 cm 
(1 in). The higher values indicate that there is a high chance for heavy rain along the 
front. Frontogenesis is occurring over the northeastern part of Nebraska at 1100 UTC 22 
January at 700 hPa (Figure 4.29). The area of maximum frontogenesis is approximately 
where the heaviest snow is indicated by radar (Figure 4.30) and the NDOT-MDSS  
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Figure 4.25: Critical thickness lines at 1800 UTC 22 January across 1000-500 hPa (red), 1000-700 hPa 
(green), 1000-850 hPa (blue), 850-700 hPa (yellow) and the surface 0° temperature (magenta) (SPC 2019) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.26: Analysis of conditions at 1800 UTC 22 January from the NDOT-MDSS (Colors correspond to 
legend in Figure 4.13) (WebMDSS™ 2018) 
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Figure 4.27: Freezing level at the surface (black) is at 1800 UTC 22 January. Also shown is the relative 
humidity and boundary layer 0°C line (red) (SPC 2019) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.28: Precipitable water in the lowest 400 hPa at 0300 UTC 22 January (SPC 2019) 
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Figure 4.29: Frontogenesis (red) occurring at 700 hPa at 1100 UTC 22 January and areas of EPVg* and 
conditional instability (shaded) at 650-500 hPa. Positive values represent areas of frontogenesis.  
(SPC 2019) 
 
Figure 4.30: Radar observations at 0700 UTC 22 January (NCAR 2018) 
53 
 
analysis (Figure 4.31). The frontogenesis is accompanied by EPVg* and conditional 
instability which are both key ingredients in producing heavy snow bands (Evans and 
Jurewicz Sr. 2009). Negative values are ideal for EPVg* to play a role in creating an 
ideal environment capable of producing heavy snowfall as well as areas where 
frontogenesis is taking place. At the same time at 850 hPa (Figure 4.32), frontogenesis is 
most prominent along the cold front located in the Mississippi Valley. The large amount 
of frontogenesis taking place is co-located with large amounts of negative EPVg*.  
 
4.2 January NDOT-MDSS results 
 
When forecasting for a mid-latitude cyclone, knowing the location of the center of 
the low in each model run is important. Knowing the location will tell you where the 
precipitation will occur and what areas will be impacted. The progression of the storm 
forecast (Figure 4.33) shows how the predicted location of the center of the low pressure 
system shifted over time for 22 January 2018. The forecasted location of the center of the 
January low pressure system at 7 days out was over the Great Lakes. As the storm 
advances toward the Great Plains, the low pressure center was forecasted to slow down 
which shifts the track to the southwest for 22 January 2018. The decrease in the speed of 
the storm causes the precipitation chances to increase in most of the central United States 
(Figure 4.34). The tightest part of the pressure gradient moves over Nebraska, which led 
to high winds becoming more of a threat. At three days out, the predicted location of the 
center of the system was situated over far southwestern Iowa. Nebraska is now on the 
northwest side of the low which is the prime location to receive wintery precipitation. 
The highest chances of precipitation are now extending into northeastern Nebraska which 
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Figure 4.31: Analysis of conditions at 1800 UTC 22 January from NDOT-MDSS (Colors correspond to 
legend in Figure 4.13) (WebMDSS™ 2018) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.32: Frontogenesis (red) occurring at 850 hPa at 1100 UTC 22 January and areas of EPVg* and 
conditional instability (shaded) at 800-750 hPa.(SPC 2019) 
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Figure 4.33: The progression of the forecast for the low pressure center of the winter storm that occurred on 
22 January 2018. A) 15 January 2018, surface map forecast 7 days out. B) 16 January 2018, surface map 
forecast 6 days out. C) 17 January 2018, surface map forecast 5 day out. D) 18 January 2018, surface map 
forecast 4 days out. E) 19 January 2018, surface map forecast 3 days out. F) 22 January 2018, surface map 
of actual location of the center of the low during the winter storm (WPC 2019) 
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Figure 4.34: The progression of the forecast for the precipitation chances of the winter storm that occurred 
on 22 January 2018. A) 15 January 2018, precipitation probability forecast 7 days out. B) 16 January 2018, 
precipitation probability forecast 6 days out. C) 17 January 2018, precipitation probability forecast 5 day 
out. D) 18 January 2018, precipitation probability forecast 4 days out. E) 19 January 2018, precipitation 
probability forecast 3 days out (WPC 2019) 
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was leading forecasters to put out a Winter Storm Watch. The forecasts (Tables 4.1-4.4) 
show that even at seven days out, there was potential for some type of precipitation. The 
forecast gradually evolves into a major winter storm that will impact most of Nebraska. 
The threats include blizzard conditions, heavy snow and the threat of freezing rain. The 
first Winter Storm Watch was issued by all 4 offices at approximately 1000 UTC 19 
January. Blizzard Warnings were issued by each office at roughly 1000 UTC 21 January 
and these warnings remained until the end of the storm at approximately 0400 UTC 23 
January. The brunt of the storm was expected to occur from 21 January to 22 January. 
When the impacts of the storm were starting to be felt in Nebraska, the low pressure 
reached peak intensity over northern Missouri and southern Iowa with a mean sea level 
pressure (MSLP) of less than 996 hPa at 1000 UTC 22 January (Figure 4.35).  
The forecasts in the NDOT-MDSS are highly dependent on the data that are input 
into the system so any changes in the forecasts will have a major impact on what is 
output by the NDOT-MDSS. The forecasted snow accumulations for each route 
(Figure 4.36) can be seen developing as new forecasts are issued by the NDOT-MDSS at 
three hourly increments. Route 1, 2, and 3 are located in eastern-northeastern Nebraska, 
Route 4 and 5 are located parallel to each other in southwestern Nebraska and Routes 6, 
7, and 8 are located in central Nebraska (Figure 3.2). The missing forecasted snowfall 
data in most routes were due to the forecast period within the NDOT-MDSS not 
extending the full length of the storm at the beginning in various routes, so forecasted 
total snowfall accumulations were not obtained. Routes 1, 2, 3, and 8 all start out with 
predictions for snowfall accumulations of greater than 30 cm. The analysis of the 
snowfall accumulation totals decreased to almost half of what was originally forecasted 
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or
 p
re
ci
pi
ta
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
co
m
in
g 
w
ee
ke
nd
. M
an
y 
m
od
el
s a
re
 in
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t t
ha
t o
ve
r .
25
 
Q
PF
 w
ill
 b
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
sy
st
em
. L
oc
at
io
n 
is
 st
ill
 u
nc
er
ta
in
. 
17
  
21
00
 
N
/A
 
N
o 
Ti
m
in
g 
an
d 
lo
ca
tio
n 
ar
e 
sti
ll 
un
ce
rta
in
 a
t t
hi
s p
oi
nt
. A
 fe
w
 m
od
el
s a
gr
ee
 th
at
 th
is
 st
or
m
 w
ill
 im
pa
ct
 th
e 
G
re
at
 P
la
in
s a
nd
 b
rin
g 
he
av
y 
sn
ow
 a
nd
 h
ig
h 
w
in
ds
 to
 th
e 
ar
ea
.  
18
  
21
25
 
N
/A
 
N
o 
A
 fe
w
 m
od
el
s h
av
e 
be
co
m
e 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
ith
 ti
m
in
g 
w
hi
le
 o
th
er
s a
re
 a
 b
it 
slo
w
er
. F
or
ec
as
te
rs
 a
re
 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 p
er
ce
nt
 o
f p
re
ci
pi
ta
tio
n 
(P
oP
) a
nd
 w
in
ds
. P
ot
en
tia
l f
or
 b
liz
za
rd
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 is
 n
ow
 p
os
sib
le
.  
19
  
10
08
 
5-
9”
 w
ith
 li
gh
t 
gl
az
e 
of
 ic
e 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
 
Fr
ee
zi
ng
 d
riz
zl
e 
is
 n
ow
 a
 th
re
at
 to
 th
e 
ar
ea
. M
od
el
s h
av
e 
slo
w
ed
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 d
ow
n,
 lo
w
er
in
g 
th
e 
Po
Ps
. 
Lo
w
 to
 m
id
-le
ve
l f
ro
nt
og
en
es
is
 w
ill
 h
el
p 
sa
tu
ra
te
 th
e 
sto
rm
 a
nd
 p
ro
vi
de
 so
m
e 
lif
t. 
W
at
ch
in
g 
th
e 
tra
ck
 
w
ill
 b
e 
ke
y 
in
 th
is
 st
or
m
. 
19
  
21
32
 
4-
10
” 
w
ith
 
lig
ht
 g
la
ze
 o
f 
ic
e 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
 
Th
e 
pa
th
 h
as
 sh
ift
ed
 sl
ig
ht
ly
 so
ut
h.
 T
he
 th
re
at
 o
f f
re
ez
in
g 
dr
iz
zl
e 
re
m
ai
ns
 fo
r S
un
da
y.
 W
in
ds
 a
re
 
be
co
m
in
g 
m
or
e 
of
 a
 c
on
ce
rn
, e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 d
ur
in
g 
tim
es
 o
f s
no
w
fa
ll.
 B
lo
w
in
g 
sn
ow
 is
 a
ls
o 
a 
th
re
at
. 
20
  
09
53
 
5-
10
” 
w
ith
 
lig
ht
 g
la
ze
 o
f 
ic
e 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
 
Th
e 
lo
ca
tio
n 
on
 th
e 
m
od
el
s i
s s
ta
rti
ng
 to
 a
lig
n.
 T
he
 w
av
e 
ju
st
 e
nt
er
ed
 C
al
ifo
rn
ia
. T
he
 w
in
ds
 (2
5-
40
m
ph
) 
ha
ve
 st
re
ng
th
en
ed
, l
ea
di
ng
 fo
re
ca
ste
rs
 to
 u
se
 th
e 
te
rm
 “
bl
iz
za
rd
” 
20
  
21
36
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
- 2
-8
” 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
- 5
-
14
” 
w
ith
 ic
in
g 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
, 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
 
Lo
ca
tio
ns
 c
on
fid
en
ce
 h
as
 in
cr
ea
se
d.
 T
he
 L
ift
ed
 In
de
x 
(L
I)
 is
 -1
 to
 -2
 w
hi
ch
 w
ill
 le
ad
 to
 e
xt
re
m
e 
sn
ow
 
ra
te
s a
lo
ng
 w
ith
 p
ot
en
tia
l f
or
 th
un
de
rs
no
w
. D
ue
 to
 p
ot
en
tia
l f
or
 d
ry
-s
lo
tti
ng
 in
 so
m
e 
ar
ea
s, 
ic
in
g 
po
te
nt
ia
l h
as
 in
cr
ea
se
d.
 
21
  
09
42
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
-4
-1
0”
 
W
W
A
-2
-6
” 
B
W
-5
-1
5”
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
, 
W
W
A
, B
W
 
W
in
ds
 a
re
 a
 m
aj
or
 c
on
ce
rn
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f h
ow
 ti
gh
t t
he
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
gr
ad
ie
nt
 is
 p
re
di
ct
ed
 to
 b
ec
om
e.
 In
te
ns
e 
sn
ow
fa
ll 
ra
te
s w
ill
 m
os
t l
ik
el
y 
oc
cu
r a
lo
ng
 w
ith
 th
un
de
rs
no
w
. T
hi
s c
ou
ld
 c
ha
ng
e 
th
e 
sn
ow
fa
ll 
to
ta
ls
 d
ue
 
to
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
hu
nd
er
sn
ow
s. 
21
  
21
23
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
-3
-6
” 
W
W
A
-1
-3
” 
B
W
-8
-1
2”
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
, 
W
W
A
, B
W
 
Th
e 
he
av
ie
st 
sn
ow
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
sh
ift
ed
 sl
ig
ht
ly
 so
ut
h.
 C
on
ve
ct
io
n 
ha
s b
ec
om
e 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
fa
rth
er
 to
 th
e 
so
ut
h.
 S
no
w
 ra
te
s m
ay
 e
xc
ee
d 
1”
 p
er
 h
ou
r i
n 
th
es
e 
ar
ea
s. 
W
in
ds
 a
re
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 b
e 
up
 to
 3
5-
45
 k
no
ts 
so
 
bl
iz
za
rd
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 w
ill
 b
e 
a 
m
aj
or
 th
re
at
 to
 th
e 
CW
A
. 
22
  
08
57
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
-1
-6
” 
W
W
A
-0
-2
” 
B
W
-9
-1
4”
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
, 
W
W
A
, B
W
 
Se
ve
ra
l l
ig
ht
ni
ng
 st
rik
es
 h
av
e 
be
en
 re
po
rte
d.
 S
no
w
 ra
te
s c
ou
ld
 re
ac
h 
up
 to
 2
-3
” 
pe
r h
ou
r i
n 
so
m
e 
ar
ea
s. 
Fo
re
ca
ste
rs
 w
ar
ne
d 
to
 b
e 
w
ea
th
er
 a
w
ar
e.
 
Ta
bl
e 
4.
2:
 N
W
S 
N
or
th
 P
la
tte
 fo
re
ca
st 
fo
r t
he
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
st
or
m
 
  D
at
e 
Ja
n 
Ti
m
e 
U
TC
 
Fo
re
ca
ste
d 
Sn
ow
 
To
ta
ls 
W
at
ch
es
/W
ar
ni
ng
s 
Co
m
m
en
ts
 
15
  
21
13
  
N
/A
 
N
o 
M
en
tio
n 
of
 “
no
ise
” 
in
 th
e 
m
id
 a
nd
 e
xt
en
de
d 
so
lu
tio
n.
  
16
  
21
35
 
A
cc
um
ul
at
in
g 
sn
ow
, n
o 
to
ta
ls
 
N
o 
Lo
ok
s f
av
or
ab
le
 fo
r d
ev
el
op
m
en
t o
f a
 C
ol
or
ad
o 
Lo
w
. G
oo
d 
ch
an
ce
 fo
r 
ac
cu
m
ul
at
in
g 
sn
ow
 in
 th
e 
en
tir
e 
fo
re
ca
st 
ar
ea
 
17
  
21
13
  
N
/A
 
N
o 
M
od
el
s a
re
 in
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t t
ha
t t
he
re
 w
ill
 b
e 
a 
sy
ste
m
 th
at
 im
pa
ct
s t
he
 a
re
a.
 T
im
in
g 
is 
sti
ll 
un
ce
rta
in
. 
18
  
20
25
  
N
/A
 
N
o 
Fr
ee
zi
ng
 d
riz
zl
e 
m
ay
 a
cc
om
pa
ny
 th
is
 st
or
m
. M
od
el
s a
re
 in
cr
ea
sin
g 
in
 c
on
fid
en
ce
 in
 
th
e 
fe
at
ur
es
 o
f t
he
 st
or
m
 b
ut
 n
ot
 th
e 
lo
ca
tio
n.
 
19
  
09
45
 
3-
7”
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 W
at
ch
  
Lo
ts 
of
 c
on
fid
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
la
rg
er
 sc
al
e 
as
pe
ct
s o
f t
he
 st
or
m
 b
ut
 th
e 
sm
al
l s
ca
le
 a
nd
 
fin
er
 fe
at
ur
es
 h
av
e 
be
en
 re
la
tiv
el
y 
ha
rd
 to
 p
re
di
ct
 
19
  
09
05
 
5-
9”
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 W
at
ch
  
Fa
irl
y 
la
rg
e 
w
in
te
r s
to
rm
 w
ith
 p
ot
en
tia
l f
or
 h
ea
vy
 sn
ow
fa
ll.
 C
on
fid
en
ce
 is
 h
ig
h.
 
H
ig
h 
w
in
ds
 h
av
e 
be
co
m
e 
a 
th
re
at
. 
20
  
10
20
  
5-
11
” 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 W
ar
ni
ng
  
 
Pa
tc
hy
 fr
ee
zi
ng
 d
riz
zl
e 
to
 p
re
ce
de
 sn
ow
fa
ll.
 S
to
rm
 w
ill
 b
e 
m
ov
in
g 
sl
ow
ly
, r
es
ul
tin
g 
in
 p
ro
lo
ng
ed
 p
er
io
ds
 o
f h
ea
vy
 sn
ow
. W
in
ds
 w
ill
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
50
kt
s d
ur
in
g 
pe
ak
 
in
te
ns
ity
. 
20
  
21
05
  
5-
11
” 
w
ith
 lo
ca
lly
 
hi
gh
er
 a
m
ou
nt
s 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 W
ar
ni
ng
  
 
B
liz
za
rd
-li
ke
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 a
re
 e
xp
ec
te
d.
 M
ai
n 
co
nc
er
n 
fo
r S
un
da
y 
is 
hi
gh
 w
in
ds
. 
Sn
ow
fa
ll 
ra
te
s c
ou
ld
 a
lso
 re
ac
h 
1”
 p
er
 h
ou
r. 
21
  
10
42
  
B
W
-8
-1
3”
 
W
SW
-5
-9
” 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 W
ar
ni
ng
 
B
liz
za
rd
 W
ar
ni
ng
 
Sy
st
em
 w
ill
 g
o 
th
ro
ug
h 
ra
pi
d 
in
te
ns
ifi
ca
tio
n 
w
hi
ch
 w
ill
 le
ad
 to
 a
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 w
in
te
r 
sto
rm
 (C
la
ss
ic
 C
ol
or
ad
o 
Lo
w
) 
21
  
20
04
  
B
W
-8
-1
2”
 
W
SW
-4
-7
” 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 W
ar
ni
ng
 
B
liz
za
rd
 W
ar
ni
ng
 
Sn
ow
 w
ill
 b
e 
en
te
rin
g 
th
e 
re
gi
on
 th
is
 e
ve
ni
ng
. B
liz
za
rd
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 a
re
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
w
ith
 w
in
ds
 g
us
tin
g 
to
 4
5m
ph
. T
he
y 
sy
st
em
 w
ill
 e
xi
t t
he
 re
gi
on
 M
on
da
y 
m
or
ni
ng
. 
22
  
09
33
  
12
-1
4”
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 W
ar
ni
ng
 
B
liz
za
rd
 W
ar
ni
ng
 
Sn
ow
 w
ill
 c
on
tin
ue
 in
 so
m
e 
ar
ea
s b
ut
 w
ill
 ta
pe
r o
ff 
so
on
. T
he
 d
ec
ay
 o
f t
he
 
de
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ar
ea
 w
ill
 o
cc
ur
 ri
gh
t a
s a
 n
ew
 sn
ow
 b
an
d 
de
ve
lo
ps
. S
tro
ng
 w
in
ds
 w
ill
 
co
nt
in
ue
 th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 th
e 
da
y.
 
Ta
bl
e 
4.
3:
 N
W
S 
O
m
ah
a 
fo
re
ca
st
 fo
r t
he
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
st
or
m
 
D
at
e 
 
Ja
n 
Ti
m
e 
U
TC
 
Fo
re
ca
ste
d 
Sn
ow
 
To
ta
ls 
W
at
ch
es
/W
ar
ni
ng
s 
Co
m
m
en
ts
 
15
  
21
30
 
N
/A
 
N
o 
A
ct
iv
e 
pa
tte
rn
 S
at
ur
da
y-
Su
nd
ay
. T
im
in
g 
is 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 b
et
w
ee
n 
m
od
el
s. 
Po
te
nt
ia
l f
or
 a
 m
es
os
ca
le
 
ba
nd
 o
f p
re
ci
pi
ta
tio
n 
16
  
20
08
 
N
/A
 
N
o 
A
 fe
w
 m
od
el
s a
re
 sh
ow
in
g 
pr
ec
ip
ita
tio
n 
fo
r S
at
ur
da
y-
Su
nd
ay
. S
no
w
 p
os
sib
le
 fo
r t
he
 n
or
th
er
n 
CW
A
 c
ou
nt
ie
s w
ith
 ra
in
/s
no
w
 m
ix
 fo
r t
he
 re
st
 
17
  
21
20
 
6-
10
” 
N
o 
M
od
el
s a
re
 in
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t t
ha
t t
he
re
 is
 p
ot
en
tia
l f
or
 a
 w
in
te
r s
to
rm
. M
oi
st
ur
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
in
 p
la
ce
 so
 th
e 
sto
rm
 c
ou
ld
 p
ro
du
ce
 la
rg
e 
am
ou
nt
s o
f s
no
w
. A
 lo
t o
f u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 re
m
ai
ns
. 
18
  
20
57
 
6-
12
” 
N
o 
N
or
th
ea
st 
N
eb
ra
sk
a 
se
em
s t
o 
be
 th
e 
ta
rg
et
 o
f t
he
 st
or
m
 a
nd
 h
ea
vy
 sn
ow
fa
ll.
 B
liz
za
rd
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 a
re
 
po
ss
ib
le
. S
to
rm
 tr
ac
t i
s c
on
si
st
en
t i
n 
m
od
el
s. 
C
ha
nc
e 
fo
r f
re
ez
in
g 
ra
in
 a
nd
 p
os
sib
le
 th
un
de
rs
to
rm
s 
in
 C
W
A
. 
19
  
09
33
 
4-
7”
, l
ig
ht
 ic
in
g 
po
ss
ib
le
 
W
in
te
r s
to
rm
 w
at
ch
 
Ev
en
 w
ith
 a
 sl
ig
ht
 sh
ift
 in
 th
e 
sto
rm
 tr
ac
k,
 N
E 
N
eb
ra
sk
a 
is
 st
ill
 p
ro
je
ct
ed
 to
 g
et
 th
e 
br
un
t o
f t
he
 
sto
rm
. S
ou
th
ea
st
 N
eb
ra
sk
a 
co
ul
d 
se
e 
co
nv
ec
tiv
e 
sh
ow
er
s. 
19
  
21
35
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
-3
-1
0”
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 W
at
ch
 
Fr
ee
zi
ng
 d
riz
zl
e 
m
ay
 h
av
e 
bi
g 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
tra
ve
l S
un
da
y 
m
or
ni
ng
. H
ea
vy
 sn
ow
 p
ot
en
tia
l i
s h
ig
he
st 
in
 W
es
te
rn
 N
eb
ra
sk
a 
an
d 
N
E 
N
eb
ra
sk
a.
 H
ig
h 
w
in
ds
 a
re
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
so
 d
rif
tin
g 
sn
ow
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
a 
th
re
at
 
20
  
09
40
 
5-
8”
, l
ig
ht
 g
la
ze
 o
f 
ic
e 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 W
at
ch
 
M
od
el
s a
re
 in
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t w
ith
 th
e 
pa
th
 o
f t
he
 lo
w
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
ce
nt
er
. T
he
re
 a
re
 so
m
e 
di
sc
re
pa
nc
ie
s i
n 
th
e 
tim
in
g/
am
ou
nt
/sa
tu
ra
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
at
m
os
ph
er
e.
 F
re
ez
in
g 
dr
iz
zl
e 
is
 st
ill
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
Su
nd
ay
 m
or
ni
ng
 
20
  
20
50
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
-8
-1
5”
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
- 2
-6
” 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
/W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
 
So
ut
he
as
te
rn
 N
eb
ra
sk
a 
sh
ou
ld
 e
xp
ec
t r
ai
n/
sn
ow
 m
ix
 d
ue
 to
 th
e 
la
rg
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 g
ra
di
en
t p
re
se
nt
 
w
ith
 th
is 
st
or
m
. M
od
el
s a
re
 q
ui
te
 in
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t o
n 
w
he
n 
th
e 
st
or
m
 w
ill
 e
nd
 a
lth
ou
gh
 e
ve
n 
af
te
r 
pr
ec
ip
ita
tio
n 
sto
ps
, b
lo
w
in
g 
sn
ow
 w
ill
 p
er
si
st.
 
21
  
09
45
 
W
in
te
r W
ea
th
er
 
A
dv
iso
ry
-1
-4
” 
B
liz
za
rd
 W
ar
ni
ng
-6
-
15
” 
W
in
te
r W
ea
th
er
 
A
dv
iso
ry
, B
liz
za
rd
 
W
ar
ni
ng
 
Th
e 
lo
w
 is
 d
ee
pe
ni
ng
 n
ea
r t
he
 R
oc
ki
es
 a
nd
 is
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 b
rin
g 
bl
iz
za
rd
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 to
 a
re
as
 in
 
N
or
th
ea
st 
N
eb
ra
sk
a.
 M
od
el
s a
gr
ee
 o
n 
th
e 
tim
in
g 
an
d 
lo
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
sto
rm
. W
in
ds
 a
re
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 
bl
ow
 3
0-
35
m
ph
 w
ith
 g
us
ts
 u
p 
to
 4
5m
ph
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
pe
ak
 o
f t
he
 sn
ow
.  
21
  
21
02
 
W
in
te
r W
ea
th
er
 
A
dv
iso
ry
-1
-5
” 
B
liz
za
rd
 W
ar
ni
ng
-4
-
17
” 
W
in
te
r W
ea
th
er
 
A
dv
iso
ry
, B
liz
za
rd
 
W
ar
ni
ng
 
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
s a
cr
os
s t
he
 C
W
A
 w
ill
 b
e 
im
po
rta
nt
 to
 w
at
ch
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f t
he
 fr
ee
zi
ng
 d
riz
zl
e 
an
d 
th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l f
or
 c
on
ve
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
so
ut
he
as
te
rn
 p
ar
t o
f N
eb
ra
sk
a.
 N
ot
 a
n 
ex
tre
m
el
y 
co
ld
 e
ve
nt
 b
ut
 
w
in
ds
 a
nd
 h
ea
vy
 sn
ow
 w
ill
 p
er
sis
t. 
22
  
22
16
 
W
in
te
r W
ea
th
er
 
A
dv
iso
ry
-0
-2
” 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
-3
-5
” 
B
liz
za
rd
 W
ar
ni
ng
-3
-
9”
 
W
in
te
r W
ea
th
er
 
A
dv
iso
ry
, B
liz
za
rd
 
W
ar
ni
ng
, W
in
te
r 
St
or
m
 W
ar
ni
ng
 
H
ea
vy
 sn
ow
 a
nd
 w
in
d 
gu
sts
 u
p 
to
 5
0m
ph
 a
lo
ng
 w
ith
 li
gh
tn
in
g 
w
er
e 
re
po
rte
d 
in
 W
es
te
rn
 N
eb
ra
sk
a.
 
Ti
m
in
g 
of
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
 fr
om
 ra
in
 to
 sn
ow
 is
 c
ru
ci
al
 to
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
s t
ha
t a
re
as
 w
ill
 re
ce
iv
e 
Ta
bl
e 
4.
4:
 N
W
S 
H
as
tin
gs
 fo
re
ca
st
 fo
r t
he
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
st
or
m
. 
D
at
e 
(J
an
) 
Ti
m
e 
(U
TC
) 
Fo
re
ca
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Figure 4.35: MSLP at 1000 UTC 22 January (SPC 2019) 
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for these routes. Major decreases in the forecasted snowfall accumulations took place 
between 18 and 9 hours before from the end of the precipitation for the routes that had 
the initial forecast totaling over 30 cm. Routes 1, 2, and 3 in eastern-northeastern 
Nebraska saw decreases of 14-18 cm from 18 to 9 hours out while Route 8, which is 
located a little farther to the west saw a decrease of approximately 7 cm during the same 
time period. Routes 4 and 5, located in southwestern Nebraska, remained relatively 
consistent with the forecasted total snowfall accumulations.  
Routes 6 and 7 show comparable snowfall accumulation patterns, although, the 
totals do vary. The routes in central Nebraska, routes 6, 7 and 8 are in similar locations; 
however, due to the slightly more eastern location of Route 8, the forecast resembles 
routes 1, 2, and 3. The eastern routes are the most inaccurate with the forecasts while the 
central and southwestern routes are much more consistent and accurate. Routes 4 and 5 
both have a total deviation of their forecasted snow accumulation of roughly 7 cm over 
the entire time period. The variation of forecasting ability based on the geographic 
location of the routes could have been caused by the major shifts in the track and timing 
of the low pressure system (Figure 4.33). The system seems to slow down throughout the 
7 days prior to the onset of the storm. The center of the low pressure also shifted from 
central Iowa to the border of Iowa and Missouri on the day of the event. Although the 
shift may seem minor, it had an impact on the location of the heaviest snow. The routes 
in northeastern Nebraska were northwest of the low center, where greater snow 
accumulations associated with Colorado lows can occur. If any minor shifts in the storm 
track occurred, the routes would no longer be in a prime location for heavy snowfall. As 
much as the system had shifted in the forecast period before the event, a minor shift 
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before impacting northeastern Nebraska is very plausible. An increase in the speed of the 
storm could lead to a large decrease in total snow accumulation for the routes. The storm 
system would not be over the area for quite as long, leading to lower snowfall totals. 
Another potential cause of the decrease in forecasted total snowfall accumulations for 
Routes 1, 2, 3, and 8 is because the transition from rain to snow took longer than was 
originally predicted by the NDOT-MDSS. Rain started in these routes at approximately 
1500 UTC 21 January. When the rain started, the forecasted start time of snowfall was 
0000 UTC 22 January. The analysis of the start time of the snowfall was 1000 UTC 22 
January, which means that the rain lingered ten hours longer than was expected in eastern 
Nebraska decreasing snowfall totals. 
The progression of the January storm from 1500 UTC 20 January to 0300 UTC 22 
January within the NDOT-MDSS (Figure 4.37) highlights the changing weather 
conditions across Nebraska. Precipitation, mostly rain (eastern) and freezing rain 
(western) is taking place across Nebraska starting at 0900 UTC 21 January. Freezing 
drizzle was discussed in the AFDs prepared by all 4 NWS offices that contain an 
identified study route as a potential hazard (Tables 4.1-4.4). The NDOT-MDSS seemed 
to do a satisfactory job of picking up on freezing drizzle. The freezing drizzle changes 
over to snow at approximately 2100 UTC 21 January in central Nebraska (Figure 4.37). 
There is still rain present in the eastern and southeastern parts of the state. Three hours 
later, heavy snow is present from 0000 UTC to 1800 UTC 22 January in central and 
northeastern Nebraska. The areas of heavy snowfall amounts shown within the NDOT-
MDSS are consistent with the snowfall totals provided by the KLBF NWS (Figure 4.1). 
The southeastern part of Nebraska receives mostly rain with some snow mixed in at the  
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very end of the storm (Figure 4.37). The lack of snowfall in southeastern Nebraska shown 
by the NDOT-MDSS is also consistent with the totals from the NWS. During the January 
storm, the main maintenance action that was done was patrolling.  
All routes had differences of 5 hours between the forecasted start times and the 
analysis of the start times within the NDOT-MDSS (Table 4.5). The minor differences 
between the forecasted and the analysis of the start times in the NDOT-MDSS shows that 
the forecast was relatively accurate. The accuracy of a start time is based off of the time 
difference that occurred between the forecasted and analysis of the start times in the 
NDOT-MDSS. Routes 1 and 3 had forecasted start times greater than 7 hours when 
compared to the analysis of the start times within the NDOT-MDSS. The NDOT-MDSS 
start time analyses were comparable with the radar observed start times. A change in the 
timing of the storm could be a cause of the erroneous forecasted start times produced by 
the NDOT-MDSS for the eastern routes; however, Route 2 is in the vicinity of Route 1 
and 3, although it did not see a timing issue. The differences in start times between the 
NDOT-MDSS and the radar could be due to the inability of the NDOT-MDSS to forecast 
the heavy snow, which is what can be detected more easily by the radar. Route 6 was the 
most accurately predicted, with no differences in any of the start times.  
Differences in forecasted end times within the NDOT-MDSS analysis and radar 
observations were also found for the studied routes (Table 4.6). The variations between 
the forecasted and analysis of the end times within the NDOT-MDSS (Table 4.6) are 
larger than the start times (Table 4.5). There was never an instance where the forecasted 
end times within the NDOT-MDSS occurred during the same hour as the analysis of the 
end times within the NDOT-MDSS. The forecasted end times were always earlier than  
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Table 4.5: Differences in start times for January Storm (Hrs) 
 NDOT-MDSS 
Forecasted vs. 
NDOT-MDSS 
Analysis 
NDOT-MDSS 
Forecasted vs. 
Radar Observed  
NDOT-MDSS 
Analysis vs. Radar 
Observed  
Route 1 -4.0 +6.5 +10.5 
Route 2 +1.0 +3.5 +2.5 
Route 3 -4.0 +2.5 +6.5 
Route 4 0.0 +1.0 -1.0 
Route 5 +1.0 0.0 -1.0 
Route 6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Route 7 -5.0 +4.0 +1.0 
Route 8 +4.0 0.0 -4.0 
 
Table 4.6: Difference in end times for January Storm (Hrs) 
 NDOT-MDSS 
Forecasted vs. 
NDOT-MDSS 
Analysis 
NDOT-MDSS 
Forecasted vs. 
Radar Observed  
NDOT-MDSS 
Analysis vs. Radar 
Observed  
Route 1 -4.0 +2.0 +6.0 
Route 2 -1.0 +4.0 +5.0 
Route 3 -3.0 +4.0 +7.0 
Route 4 -5.0 -2.0 +3.0 
Route 5 -5.0 -2.0 +3.0 
Route 6 -2.0 -0.5 +2.5 
Route 7 -6.0 -1.0 +7.0 
Route 8 -5.0 +0.5 +5.5 
 
+= NDOT-MDSS started/ended later 
-=NDOT-MDSS started/ended earlier 
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the analysis of the end times within the NDOT-MDSS (Table 4.6). The discrepancy in the 
forecasted end times could have been caused by the storm slowing down over Nebraska, 
causing the storm duration to be extended. In many cases, light flurries occurred after the 
heavy snow ended, which would cause the storm to be extended longer in time than was 
forecasted. Light flurries at the end of the storm may also be the cause of differences in 
the analysis of end times within the NDOT-MDSS when compared with the radar 
observed end times. The analysis end times within the NDOT-MDSS always ended later 
than what were observed by the radar. Flurries may not have been picked up by the radar 
depending on the height of the radar beam and distance away from the radar. When the 
forecasted end time within the NDOT-MDSS was compared to the radar observed end 
time, there was less variation than when the forecasted end time within the NDOT-MDSS 
was compared to the analysis of the end time within the NDOT-MDSS. These minor 
inaccuracies were probably caused by the NDOT-MDSS predicting when the heavy snow 
would end rather than the flurries. The radar’s ability to pick up on the heavy snow may 
have caused the forecasted start times within the NDOT-MDSS and the radar observed 
end times to align relatively well since flurries were not forecasted well by the NDOT-
MDSS and may not be visible in the radar images. 
The overall accuracy for predicting total snowfall accumulation varied from route 
to route. Some of the miscalculations were potentially based on track and timing changes 
at the various locations of the routes. Routes farther to the west were more accurately 
predicted than the routes to the east. The location of the route did not appear to have any 
major influence on the start and end time differences. It could potentially be said that the 
routes farther to the east were again the least accurate of all locations because of the large 
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amount of variation, although, other routes in different locations also experienced 
moderate differences in their start and end times. Because of the way the NDOT-MDSS 
saves events, the forecasts for the western routes also had a shorter lead time before the 
storm impacted them, making forecasts in the western part of the state slightly more 
accurate due to the shorter lead time. Start times, for the most part, were more accurate 
than end times in every category that was analyzed. Another limitation was the location 
of the route with respect to the radar because snowfall would have not been picked up in 
some cases due to the precipitation occurring below the beam of the radar. 
Having accurate wind speeds for each route is vital for maintenance crews 
because wind speeds will help determine whether to apply chemicals or whether to let the 
snow blow off the roadways. Adding chemicals during high wind events will melt the 
snow on the roadways and chemicals will have to be continually applied throughout the 
storm to avoid icy conditions. The most common action is to let the wind blow the snow 
off the roadway instead of applying anything. Wind speeds and gusts from all 8 routes in 
the NDOT-MDSS were compared to ASOS stations data in the route’s general area. 
Routes 1, 2, and 3 are located in the same general area, so the reports from the ASOS 
station located at Wayne Municipal Airport (KLCG) were used for comparison 
(Figure 3.2). During the January storm, the Route 3 NDOT-MDSS sustained winds best 
followed the data from the KLCG ASOS station because they are very closely located 
(Figure 4.38a). Route 1, located to the southwest of the KLCG ASOS station, had lower 
sustained winds than what the ASOS station reported during most hours. They both 
followed the same general pattern except for between 1200-1300 UTC 22 January. The 
NDOT-MDSS sustained winds decreased in Route 1 to 7.2 m s-1 (14 kts) while the  
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Figure 4.38: Sustained wind speeds and wind gusts during the January storm. A) Route 1 
(blue), Route 2 (red), Route 3 (green), and KLCG ASOS station (black). B) Route 4 
(blue), Route 5 (red), KLBF ASOS station (black). C) Route 6 (blue), Route (7), and 
KBVN ASOS station (black). D) Route 8 (blue) and KANW ASOS station (black). The 
storm duration was plotted (light blue) to show when the storm was taking place per each 
route. 
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KLCG ASOS was reporting sustained winds of 12.4-12.7 m s-1 (24-25 kts). Route 2 had 
much lower winds than both the KLCG ASOS and Routes 1 and 3 between 1400-1800 
UTC. The cause for the difference of approximately 7.7 m s-1 (15 kts) is unknown. The 
wind gusts from the NDOT-MDSS and the KLCG ASOS followed a similar pattern to 
the sustained winds. Route 2 generally had lower wind gusts and Route 3 had gusts very 
similar to what the KLCG ASOS was reporting. Route 1 and 3 were reporting much 
higher wind gusts than the KLCG ASOS while Route 2 was reporting much lower wind 
gusts 25-30 hours after the storm started. There was only one notable difference in the 
Route 2 winds at 64 hours from the start of the saved storms that seemed abnormal. All of 
the other wind gusts appeared to be similar to what they were when the storm was not 
taking place. 
Routes 4 and 5 were grouped with the KLBF ASOS station (Figure 3.2). The 
routes were in agreement within the NDOT-MDSS, which is expected due to their close 
proximity and same orientation (Figure 4.38b). The route values within the NDOT-
MDSS were in agreement with the KLBF ASOS values given for winds. The KLBF 
ASOS values were slightly higher in most hours than both routes. Between 1400-1500 
UTC 22 January, no data were reported from the KLBF ASOS. There were no major 
inconsistences in the wind gusts reported for Routes 4 and 5 and what the KLBF ASOS 
reported. Towards the end of the storm, gusts did not meet the criteria to be reported by 
either source.  
Routes 6 and 7 had a centrally located ASOS station at Ainsworth Regional 
Airport (KANW) (Figure 3.2). The two routes were not right beside the KANW ASOS, 
although the routes were within a reasonable distance. Route 6, located to the southwest 
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of the KANW ASOS was more in agreement with the KANW ASOS data reports than 
Route 7 (Figure 4.38c). Route 7, located to the northwest of the KANW ASOS had lower 
sustained winds with a large decrease occurring from 0600-1000 UTC 22 January. The 
overall pattern was not as aligned as the other routes and their ASOS stations; however, 
this may be caused by the greater distance between the NDOT-MDSS routes and the 
KANW ASOS. The gusts from Route 7 were consistently lower than the gusts reported 
from Route 6 and the KANW ASOS. Route 6 was reporting higher wind gusts than the 
KANW ASOS at the start of the storm; however, as the storm progressed, the gusts 
started to become more similar in value. Towards the end of the storm, the wind gusts 
were not high enough to be reported by either the NDOT-MDSS or the KANW ASOS. 
Route 8 was not close enough to any of the ASOS stations that the other routes were 
grouped with so it was individually grouped with the Albion Municipal Airport (KBVN) 
(Figure 3.2). The NDOT-MDSS values for wind speed are not quite in agreement with 
the values from the KBVN ASOS (Figure 4.38d). At 1100 UTC 22 January, the NDOT-
MDSS reported sustained winds at 4.1 m s-1 (8 kts) while the KBVN ASOS has the 
sustained winds at 10.8 m s-1 (21 kts). The NDOT-MDSS and KBVN ASOS wind speeds 
throughout the storm follow the same overall pattern; however, there are inconsistencies 
when looking more in detail the sustained winds being reported by both the KBVN 
ASOS and the NDOT-MDSS. The wind gusts reported by the NDOT-MDSS in Route 8 
are relatively similar to what was being reported by the KBVN ASOS. There were no 
major inconsistencies between the two, although there were no wind gusts that met the 
criteria to be considered high enough during certain periods in the storm. 
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The ASOS stations that were used to find the accuracy of the NDOT-MDSS wind 
data were also the ones used for the analysis of the temperature data in the NDOT-
MDSS. During the January storm, Routes 1, 2, and 3 as well as the KLCG ASOS station 
have temperatures that were in agreement up until 60 hours from the start of the storm 
(Figure 4.39a). Route 1 sees a temperature decrease while the KLCG ASOS station sees a 
temperature increase. Routes 2 and 3 are decreasing at a relatively steady rate at this time. 
After the sharp increase in temperatures at the KLCG ASOS station, there is a large 
decrease where it drops down 5-7 °C lower than all of the routes. Route 3 increases to 
approximately what the other routes are seeing within the NDOT-MDSS. Routes 4 and 5 
were perfectly in agreement within the NDOT-MDSS during the January storm 
(Figure 4.39b). The KLBF ASOS station followed the same pattern as the routes up until 
40 hours from the start of the storm. At approximately 70 hours from the start of the 
storm, both Route 4 and Route 5 had a large decrease in temperature; however, the KLBF 
station stayed warmer. The KLBF ASOS station is in exactly the same location as both 
routes so this result shows some inaccuracy.  
The temperatures from Routes 6 and 7 followed the same pattern as the KANW 
ASOS station, although all three temperatures were a few degrees off from one another 
(Figure 4.39c). This slight difference occurred throughout most of the saved storm. 
Temperatures in Route 6 were consistently lower than the other two temperatures, 
especially at the end of the saved storm where Route 6’s temperatures plummet close to 
10 °C below what is being reported at the KANW ASOS station and the analysis of the 
temperatures by the NDOT-MDSS at Route 7. The temperatures from the KANW ASOS 
station and Route 7 were in good agreement throughout the saved storm. The pattern of  
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Figure 4.39: Air temperatures during the January storm. A) Route 1 (blue), Route 2 (red), 
Route 3 (green), and KLCG ASOS station (black). B) Route 4 (blue), Route 5 (red), 
KLBF ASOS station (black). C) Route 6 (blue), Route (7), and KBVN ASOS station 
(black). D) Route 8 (blue) and KANW ASOS station (black). The storm duration was 
plotted (light blue) to show when the storm was taking place per each route. 
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the air temperatures reported by the KBVN ASOS station was very similar to the analysis 
of the air temperatures by the NDOT-MDSS for Route 8 (Figure 4.39d). The 
temperatures in the NDOT-MDSS were slightly lower than the air temperatures at the 
KBVN ASOS station. There are two peaks that occur in the analysis of the air 
temperature between 50 and 60 hours from the start of the saved storm that were not seen 
at the ASOS station. Another peak in the analysis of the air temperatures by the NDOT-
MDSS occurred around 80 hours from the start of the saved storm. This was followed by 
a decrease in the air temperature that was also not seen by the KBVN ASOS station. 
Throughout the storm duration in Routes 1, 2, and 3, there were no large deviations from 
the normal temperature; however, the KLCG ASOS station observed a major increase in 
temperature at 66 hours from the start of the saved storm then it decreases very rapidly 
until the end of the storm. The issues between Routes 4 and 5 and the KLBF ASOS 
station began approximately when the storm began. After the storm began at 1900 UTC 
21 January, the route and the ASOS temperatures were not in agreement through the end 
of the saved storm.  
Routes 1, 2, and 3 are grouped with the Scriber RWIS station (Figure 3.2). The 
Emerson RWIS station did not have data available for the April storm so the Scribner 
RWIS was chosen in its place due to the similar location and pavement temperature 
values. The pavement temperatures in Routes 1, 2, and 3 in the January storm were very 
in agreement with the Scribner RWIS station although the RWIS station had slightly 
lower pavement temperatures (Figure 4.40a). The pavement temperatures from the 
Emerson RWIS station were very similar to the pavement temperatures at the Scribner 
RWIS station. The only area of divergence of the road temperatures occurs from 60 to 84  
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Figure 4.40: Pavement temperatures during the January storm. A) Route 1 (blue), Route 2 
(red), Route 3 (green), and Scribner RWIS station (black). B) Route 4 (blue), Route 5 
(red), and Wellfleet RWIS station (black). C) Route 6 (blue), Route (7), and North 
Thedford RWIS station (black). D) Route 8 (blue) and Cedar Rapids station (black). The 
storm duration was plotted (light blue) to show when the storm was taking place per each 
route. 
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hours from the start of the storm, although the difference was not very large. The 
Wellfleet RWIS station was grouped with Routes 4 and 5 in the NDOT-MDSS 
(Figure 3.2). The pavement temperatures in Routes 4 and 5 were in agreement in the 
January storm up until approximately 70 hours from the start of the storm (Figure 4.40b). 
The pavement temperatures obtained from the Wellfleet RWIS station were in agreement 
with both routes until up to 70 hours from the start of the storm as well. Route 6 and 7 
were grouped with the centrally located North Thedford RWIS station (Figure 3.2). The 
North Thedford RWIS station pavement temperatures are lower than the pavement 
temperature both Routes 6 and 7 although they did follow the same overall pattern 
(Figure 4.40c). The inconsistency of the RWIS station could be due to its farther distance 
to the study routes. Route 8 was grouped with the Cedar Rapids RWIS station due its 
very close proximity (Figure 3.2). Route 8’s pavement temperatures agreed extremely 
well with the Cedar Rapids RWIS station (Figure 4.40d). There are almost no differences 
in the values. The January pavement temperatures from all routes and ASOS stations had 
no major deviations from the normal patter observed when the storm was occurring to 
when it was not. 
It is very important for an RWIS and a similarly located ASOS station to have the 
same or relatively similar temperatures. Different temperatures could mean that all 
variables are inconsistent which could lead to different weather conditions than what is 
being reported. The Scribner RWIS station was compared to the KLCG ASOS station. 
Both stations followed the same pattern until about 60 hours from the start of the January 
storm (Figure 4.41a). The ASOS temperature then spiked and proceeded to drop down to 
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Figure 4.41: Air temperatures during the January Storm. A) Scribner RWIS station (blue) 
and KLCG ASOS station (black). B) Wellfleet RWIS station (red) and KLBF ASOS 
station (black). C) North Thedford RWIS station (green) and KBVN ASOS station 
(black). D) Cedar Rapids RWIS station (magenta) and KANW ASOS station (black). 
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4-9 °C below the temperature observed at the Scribner RWIS station. The Scribner RWIS 
is located approximately 70 km south of the KLCG ASOS station (Figure 3.2) so that 
may be what caused the difference in the two stations. The Wellfleet RWIS station was 
compared to the KLBF ASOS station. The station temperatures are in agreement up until 
40 hours from the start of the storm (Figure 4.41b). The KLBF ASOS station reports 
slightly warmer temperatures until the Wellfleet RWIS temperatures spike at 
approximately 65 hours from the start of the storm. After this spike, the KLBF ASOS 
station goes back to being slightly warmer than what was being reported at the Wellfleet 
RWIS station. The differences are relatively small between these two stations. The 
KANW ASOS station reported more warming at approximately 20 hours from the start of 
the storm in comparison to the North Thedford RWIS (Figure 4.41c). Throughout the rest 
of the storm, there was not much of a difference in temperature; however, the KANW 
ASOS station generally reported slightly warmer temperatures than what was being 
reported at the North Thedford RWIS station. The Cedar Rapids RWIS station was 
compared to the KBVN ASOS station. The temperatures followed relatively the same 
pattern aside from a few spikes in temperature from both stations (Figure 4.41d). The first 
peak that differs between the station starts at 11 hours from the start of the storm. The 
Cedar Rapids RWIS station is reporting temperatures that are 3-5 °C greater than the 
temperatures being reported at the KBVN ASOS station. The temperatures decrease 
rapidly and end up 2-3 °C cooler for the next 15-20 hours. The second spike in 
temperature starts at approximately 60 hours from the start of the storm where 
temperatures at the KBVN ASOS station are 2-5 °C warmer than the Cedar Rapids RWIS 
temperatures. 
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4.3 April Synoptic Results 
 
Moist air was advected northward into the Great Plains as a low pressure system 
moved in from the west on 13 April 2018. The presence of the moisture and the cold air 
produced rapid rising motion which brought strong winds and heavy snow to the Plain 
States. Severe thunderstorms were also observed in parts of the Midwest and Mississippi 
Valley. The storm system first brought snow and high winds to the western part of 
Nebraska on 13 April 2018 and moved eastward throughout the day. Heavy snow fell in 
central Nebraska during 14 April with snow totals ranging from 20.32-45.72 cm (8 to 
18 in) by 15 April (Figure 4.42). Many road closures were reported across Nebraska 
during the event, including Interstate 80. Closures were caused by the heavy snow along 
with snow drifts that reached over a meter in height in many places. Temperatures 
dropped below freezing which most likely affected which deicing chemicals had to be 
applied to the road surface due to the different temperature thresholds of each of these 
chemicals. High profile vehicles also had difficulty traveling because of high winds that 
accompanied the event (U.S. Department of Commerce 2018b).  
The 0000 UTC 14 April 2018 atmospheric sounding for North Platte 
(Figure 4.43), indicates that the temperature does not exceed 0 °C (32 °F) in the 
atmospheric column. The DGZ is located between approximately 650hPa and 500hPa 
and is nearly saturated, allowing for ice crystal growth to occur in this layer. Below the 
DGZ layer the atmosphere is saturated, aiding crystal growth to the surface. North Platte 
was receiving precipitation as indicated by radar (Figure 4.44) at 0025 UTC; however, 
the KLBF ASOS was reporting no precipitation. The radar is approximately 25 minutes  
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Figure 4.42: Snowfall totals throughout the state of Nebraska from the NWS for the April storm (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 2018b) 
 
 
Figure 4.43: The profile of the atmosphere for North Platte, NE at 0000 UTC 14 April 2018 (Plymouth 
State 2018) 
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Figure 4.44: Radar image 0025 UTC 14 April 2018 (NCAR 2018) 
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past the hour so there could have been a break in precipitation at the KLBF ASOS station 
prior to when the radar image was taken at 0025 UTC. At 0000 UTC April 14, the 
Omaha/Valley sounding (Figure 4.45) is showing there is no snow occurring at this time 
due to the lack of saturation in the DGZ. The amount of precipitable water in the 
atmosphere is 1.78 cm (0.70 in). The temperature at the surface reaches approximately 
15 °C (59 °F) which means that if any precipitation was falling, it would be rain. The 
atmospheric sounding shows that there is dry air, which coincides with the radar showing 
no precipitation over eastern Nebraska at 0025 UTC 14 April (Figure 4.44). Twelve 
hours later at 1200 UTC 14 April, the North Platte sounding (Figure 4.46) shows that the 
atmosphere is still very close to saturation and all the temperatures are under 0 °C 
(32 °F). When compared to the radar composite (Figure 4.47), there are areas of light 
precipitation still taking place even though the system is moving out of the area. The 
Omaha/Valley sounding (Figure 4.48) shows that the DGZ is nearly saturated at the 
lowest levels, although there is a layer of dry air in place from approximately 650-
550 hPa. The dry layer may be the cause of the lack of precipitation occurring near 
Omaha as shown by radar (Figure 4.47). The main areas of heavy snowfall are still 
situated over central Nebraska. A 500 hPa shortwave trough becomes visible at 
approximately 0000 UTC 12 April 2018 off the coast of California (Figure 4.49). The 
trough is positively tilted so it is continuing to build at this time. The progression of the 
shortwave places the trough inland over the western states by 0000 UTC April 13 (Figure 
4.50). The shortwave intensified during the next 24 hours as it further moved eastward. A 
closed low has yet to form by 1200 UTC 13 April 2018 (Figure 4.51) and the intensity of 
the system has remained constant. The system strengthens and becomes closed by   
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Figure 4.45: The profile of the atmosphere for Omaha, NE at 0000 UTC 14 April 2018 (Plymouth State 
2018) 
 
 
Figure 4.46: The profile of the atmosphere for North Platte, NE at 1200 UTC 14 April 2018 (Plymouth 
State 2018) 
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Figure 4.47: Radar image at 1120 UTC 14 April (NCAR 2018) 
 
 
Figure 4.48: The profile of the atmosphere for Omaha, NE at 1200 UTC 14 April 2018 (Plymouth State 
2018) 
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Figure 4.49: Different levels in the atmosphere at 0000 UTC 12 April 2018. a) 850 hPa b) 700 hPa 
c) 500 hPa d) 300 hPa (SPC 2019). 
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Figure 4.50: Different levels in the atmosphere at 0000 UTC 13 April 2018. a) 850 hPa b) 700 hPa 
c) 500 hPa d) 300 hPa (SPC 2019) 
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Figure 4.51: Different levels in the atmosphere at 1200 UTC 13 April 2018. a) 850 hPa b) 700 hPa 
c) 500 hPa d) 300 hPa (SPC 2019) 
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0000 UTC 14 April 2018 (Figure 4.52). The strengthening occurs after the shortwave 
passes over the mountains which indicates that lee-side cyclogenesis occurred prior to 
0000 UTC 14 April. At this time, the effects of the storm were starting to be felt in 
Nebraska. By 1200 UTC 14 April (Figure 4.53), the storm is at peak intensity over the 
state. CAA can be seen at 850 hPa (Figure 4.53a) to the left of the trough axis over 
Nebraska and Kansas.  
At 1900 UTC 13 April at 700 hPa (Figure 4.54), frontogenesis is occurring over 
most of northwestern Nebraska. The analysis of the conditions in northwestern Nebraska, 
according to the NDOT-MDSS, is a combination of heavy and moderate snow 
(Figure 4.55). A large area of frontogenesis is joined with negative values of EPVg* 
along with some conditional instability. These conditions are ideal for producing 
snowfall. At 0000 UTC 14 April, the center of the low pressure system is located in 
northwestern Kansas (Figure 4.56) with areas of vorticity concentrated on the left side of 
the trough. This is co-located with a jet streak at 300 hPa (Figure 4.57). The critical 
thicknesses are spread out across the central Plains (Figure 4.58) with all layers except 
1000-500 hPa coming into central Nebraska. At 0700 UTC 14 April at 500 hPa 
(Figure 4.59), an area of positive vorticity can be seen covering parts of Nebraska, 
Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas. The highest amount of positive vorticity can be seen in 
eastern Nebraska and north central Kansas. This is roughly where the surface low 
pressure is centered. Vorticity exceeds 3 x 10-6 s-1. Both the jet streak and the area of 
positive vorticity indicates that the region has a lot of divergence aloft, which is a 
favorable synoptic set-up for a winter storm. In addition to vorticity, vertical motion, 
found at 850 hPa, can show the amount of upper-level divergence that is occurring.  
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Figure 4.52: Different levels in the atmosphere at 0000 UTC 14 April 2018. a) 850 hPa b) 700 hPa  c) 500 
hPa d) 300 hPa (SPC 2019) 
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Figure 4.53: Different levels in the atmosphere at 1200 UTC 14 April 2018. a) 850 hPa b) 700 hPa 
c) 500 hPa d) 300 hPa (SPC 2019) 
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Figure 4.54: Frontogenesis (red) is occurring at 850 hPa at 1900 UTC 13 April and areas of EPVg* and 
conditional instability at 800-750 hPa. (SPC 2019) 
 
 
Figure 4.55: Analysis of conditions at 1900 UTC 13 April from the NDOT-MDSS (Colors correspond to 
legend in January Synoptic) (WebMDSS™ 2018) 
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Figure 4.56: Vorticity and height at 500 hPa at 0000 UTC 14 April (SPC 2019) 
 
 
Figure 4.57: Average omega (850hPa) overlaid on the jet stream (300hPa) at 0000 UTC 14 April (SPC 
2019) 
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Figure 4.58: Critical thickness lines at 0000 UTC 14 April across 1000-500 hPa (red), 1000-700 hPa 
(green), 1000-850 hPa (blue), 850-700 hPa (yellow) and the surface 0° temperature (magenta) (SPC 2019) 
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The critical thickness lines for the layers of 1000-500 hPa, 1000-700 hPa and 850-
700 hPa at 0600 UTC 14 April (Figure 4.60), which is where the rain-snow line falls 
approximately, are all located over east-central Nebraska. The location of the critical 
thickness lines imply any precipitation falling in the eastern part of the state should be 
rain, while the western part of the state should be snow, especially since all the critical 
thickness lines are close together. The rain-snow division shown by the NDOT-MDSS at 
0600 UTC 14 April (Figure 4.61) is roughly in the same location, with the appropriate 
precipitation type occurring in the right areas of the state. The average vertical motion at 
0700 UTC 14 April (Figure 4.62) is overlaid on top of the jet stream (300 hPa). The area 
of enhanced vertical motion over north central and eastern Nebraska aligns with areas of 
higher vorticity and the jet streak which means that there is sufficient divergence 
occurring for vertical motion to be possible. At the 300 hPa level at 1200 UTC 14 April 
(Figure 4.53d), the trough extends across the western part of the United States with a jet 
streak situated over the central states. The placement of the jet streak allows for 
divergence aloft over Nebraska as the storm moves through. Divergence aloft also 
suggests that there is convergence at the surface which favors lift. Divergence aloft is a 
necessary ingredient for strong Colorado low type storms, which the April event was.  
By 0900 UTC 14 April (Figure 4.63), there was a large area of high levels of 
frontogenesis centered directly over northeastern Nebraska. The frontogenesis is also 
accompanied by optimal amounts of EPVg*. At approximately the same time the 
frontogenesis was occurring over northeastern Nebraska, the NDOT-MDSS was showing 
heavy snowfall in the area (Figure 4.64). At 0900 UTC, eastern Nebraska has the highest 
precipitable water content in the lowest 400 hPa of the atmosphere with 1.5 cm (0.2 in) 
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Figure 4.60: Critical thickness lines at 0600 UTC 14 April across 1000-500 hPa (red), 1000-700 hPa 
(green), 1000-850 hPa (blue), 850-700 hPa (yellow) and the surface 0° temperature (magenta) (SPC 2019) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.61: Analysis of conditions at 0600 UTC 14 April from the NDOT-MDSS (Colors correspond to 
legend in January Synoptic) (WebMDSS™ 2018) 
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Figure 4.62: Average omega (850hPa) overlaid on the jet stream (300hPa) at 0700 UTC 14 April 
(SPC 2019) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.63: Frontogenesis (red) is occurring at 850 hPa at 0900 UTC 14 April and areas of EPVg* and 
conditional instability at 800-750 hPa. (SPC 2019) 
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Figure 64: Analysis of conditions at 0900 UTC 14 April from the NDOT-MDSS (Colors correspond to 
legend in January synoptic) (WebMDSS™ 2018) 
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(Figure 4.65). Eastern Nebraska is receiving mostly rain. Central Nebraska has 
precipitable water values of 0.76-1.3 cm and is receiving snowfall. The highest 
precipitable water values are found along the cold front that runs through the Mississippi 
Valley (Figure 4.66). The shape of the storm seen in visible satellite imagery is a comma 
shape which means that mid-latitude cyclone has begun to occlude.  
 The critical thickness line at 1800 UTC 14 April (Figure 4.67) can be seen all the 
way down into the Texas panhandle. The placement of the critical thickness lines 
indicates that the precipitation type for the majority of Nebraska is expected to be snow 
except for potentially the southeastern corner of Nebraska. The image that the NDOT-
MDSS provides for 1800 UTC 14 April (Figure 4.68) verifies that there is snow taking 
place in most parts of the state besides southeastern Nebraska. The rain that is falling in 
southeastern Nebraska could be due to the critical thickness line of 1300 m that 
represents the 1000-850 hPa layer that is hovering over the southeastern part of Nebraska. 
The critical thickness line not quite reaching southeastern Nebraska indicates that the 
layer between 1000-850 hPa is above freezing. This would allow for melting of the ice 
crystals, leading to rain in the area. These lines do not align quite as well as the critical 
thickness lines from 0600 UTC, so using the critical thickness of the layers might not be 
quite as accurate in predicting where the rain-snow line will fall. The freezing line at 
1800 UTC 14 April (Figure 4.69) shows the vicinity where the rain-snow line should be. 
The line is in approximately the same area where the critical thickness lines fall 
(Figure 4.67). The NDOT-MDSS map exhibiting the analysis at the surface at 1800 UTC 
(Figure 4.68) shows that the far southeastern part of Nebraska is still experiencing rain 
while the rest of the state is experiencing snow. The vorticity is now maximized over  
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Figure 4.65: Precipitable water content in the lowest 400 hPa at 0900 UTC 14 April (SPC 2019) 
 
Figure 4.66: Satellite surface map of the United States at 0930 UTC 14 April (Unisys 2018) 
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Figure 4.67: Critical thickness lines at 1800 UTC 14 April across 1000-500 hPa (red), 1000-700 hPa 
(green), 1000-850 hPa (blue), 850-700 hPa (yellow) and the surface 0° temperature (magenta) (SPC 2019) 
 
 
Figure 4.68: Analysis of conditions at 1800 UTC 14 April from the NDOT-MDSS (Colors follow legend in 
January Synoptic) (WebMDSS™ 2018) 
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Figure 4.69: Freezing level at the surface (black) at 1800 UTC 14 April. It also shows the relative humidity 
and boundary layer 0°C line (red) (SPC 2019) 
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Kansas and is very concentrated from Missouri down to Texas (Figure 4.70). The jet 
streak, located at 300 hPa, is co-located with areas of vorticity as well as areas of rising 
motion (Figure 4.71).  
 
4.4 April NDOT-MDSS Results 
 
The predicted location of the low pressure center for 14 April 2018 (Figure 4.72) 
was modified during the preceding week before major impacts were seen. The forecasted 
location at 7 days out was over northwestern Iowa with a strong pressure gradient already 
in place. Over the next few days, the forecasted location of the low’s center only 
experienced minor shifts to a slightly more southern location in Iowa. The pressure 
gradient remained strong through these shifts. The observed center at 1330 UTC 14 April 
2018 was over northeastern Kansas (Figure 4.72f). The pressure gradient had weakened 
somewhat as well. The precipitation probabilities (Figure 4.73) 7 days out were correct in 
the location of the precipitation with only minor variations. As the confidence increases, 
the probabilities increase and the comma shape of the mid-latitude cyclone is very 
prominent. Northeastern Nebraska has the highest probability to receive precipitation 
from the storm.  
The forecasts from the NWS offices (Tables 4.6-4.10) predicted that there would 
be a winter storm that would impact the area 7 days out. The confidence of the offices 
that a storm will be impacting the area so far out corresponds well with how the location 
of the center of the low having only minor shifts over time in the model outputs. Winter 
storm watches were issued relatively early due to the confidence in the forecasts. The 
NWS offices were also extremely confident that high winds would be a major threat to 
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Figure 4.70: Vorticity and height at 500 hPa at 1800 UTC 14 April (SPC 2019) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.71: Average omega (850 hPa) overlaid on the jet stream (300 hPa) at 1800 UTC 14 April 
(SPC 2019) 
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Figure 4.72: The progression of the forecast for the winter storm that occurred on 14 April 2018. A)  7 
April 2018, surface map forecast 7 days out. B) 8 April 2018, surface map forecast 6 days out. C) 9 April 
2018, surface map forecast 5 day out. D) 10 April 2018, surface map forecast 4 days out. E) 11 April 2018, 
surface map forecast 3 days out. E) 14 April 2018, surface map of actual location of the center of the low 
during the winter storm (WPC 2019). 
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Figure 4.73: The progression of the forecast for the winter storm that occurred on 14 April 2018. A) 7 April 
2018, precipitation probability forecast 7 days out. B) 8 April 2018, precipitation probability forecast 6 
days out. C) 9 April 2018, precipitation probability forecast 5 day out. D) 10 April 2018, precipitation 
probability forecast 4 days out. E) 11 April 2018, precipitation probability forecast 3 days out (WPC 2019).  
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ts
 o
f s
no
w
 a
cc
um
ul
at
io
n 
14
 
15
35
 
B
W
-
A
dd
iti
on
al
 
sn
ow
 
ac
cu
m
ul
at
io
ns
 
of
 1
-7
” 
B
W
 
B
liz
za
rd
 is
 o
ng
oi
ng
 in
 th
e 
ar
ea
. T
he
 sy
st
em
 is
 le
av
in
g 
th
e 
ar
ea
 sl
ow
er
 th
an
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
so
 sn
ow
 to
ta
ls
 h
av
e 
be
en
 ra
ise
d.
 P
re
ss
ur
e 
gr
ad
ie
nt
 is
 st
ill
 st
ro
ng
 so
 h
ig
h 
w
in
ds
 a
re
 st
ill
 a
 th
re
at
. 
Ta
bl
e 
4.
8:
 N
W
S 
O
m
ah
a 
fo
re
ca
st
 fo
r t
he
 A
pr
il 
st
or
m
 
D
at
e 
A
pr
il 
Ti
m
e 
U
TC
 
Fo
re
ca
ste
d 
Sn
ow
 
To
ta
ls 
W
at
ch
es
/W
ar
n
in
gs
 
Co
m
m
en
ts
 
8 
25
9 
N
/A
 
N
o 
Th
er
e 
is
 p
ot
en
tia
l f
or
 th
un
de
rs
to
rm
s o
n 
Th
ur
sd
ay
. A
 th
re
at
 o
f a
 st
ro
ng
 c
yc
lo
ne
 is
 in
 p
la
ce
 
fo
r t
he
 c
om
in
g 
w
ee
ke
nd
. 
9 
 
25
7 
N
/A
 
N
o 
M
od
el
s a
re
 in
 g
oo
d 
ag
re
em
en
t t
ha
t t
he
re
 w
ill
 b
e 
a 
sy
st
em
 a
ff
ec
tin
g 
th
e 
ar
ea
 o
ve
r t
he
 
w
ee
ke
nd
. T
he
y 
ar
e 
le
ss
 c
on
fid
en
t i
n 
th
e 
sm
al
le
r d
et
ai
ls 
of
 th
e 
sto
rm
. 
10
  
35
1 
N
/A
 
N
o 
Th
un
de
rs
to
rm
s a
re
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 p
re
ce
de
 th
e 
w
in
te
r s
to
rm
. H
ig
h 
w
in
ds
 a
re
 n
ow
 a
 th
re
at
. 
Ra
in
 w
ill
 c
ha
ng
e 
to
 m
od
er
at
e 
to
 h
ea
vy
 sn
ow
 in
 so
m
e 
ar
ea
s. 
11
 
35
8 
3-
12
” 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
 
A
s t
he
 st
or
m
 m
ov
es
 c
lo
se
r, 
th
e 
in
te
ns
ity
 o
f t
he
 th
re
at
 o
f h
ig
h 
w
in
ds
 a
nd
 h
ea
vy
 sn
ow
 
in
cr
ea
se
s. 
Pr
io
r t
o 
th
e 
sto
rm
, t
hu
nd
er
sto
rm
s m
ay
 b
e 
br
in
gi
ng
 d
iff
er
en
t t
yp
es
 o
f t
hr
ea
ts
 
su
ch
 a
s h
ai
l a
nd
 to
rn
ad
oe
s. 
D
ue
 to
 th
e 
hi
gh
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
fo
rm
in
g 
to
 th
e 
no
rth
, t
he
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
gr
ad
ie
nt
 w
ill
 b
e 
pr
et
ty
 st
ro
ng
. 
12
 
41
6 
3-
12
” 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
 
Fr
ee
zi
ng
 ra
in
 is
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 a
 th
re
at
 fo
r t
he
 a
pp
ro
ac
hi
ng
 st
or
m
. T
hu
nd
er
sto
rm
s a
re
 st
ill
 
pr
ed
ic
te
d 
to
 ta
ke
 p
la
ce
 o
ve
r t
he
 C
W
A
 p
rio
r t
o 
th
e 
st
or
m
. D
ep
en
di
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
tim
e 
of
 th
e 
tra
ns
iti
on
 fr
om
 ra
in
 to
 sn
ow
, t
he
 to
ta
ls 
co
ul
d 
be
 lo
w
er
ed
. M
en
tio
n 
of
 b
liz
za
rd
 c
on
di
tio
ns
. 
12
 
33
9 
B
W
-4
-1
0”
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
-1
-3
” 
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
, 
B
liz
za
rd
 
W
ar
ni
ng
 
Th
e 
la
rg
e 
pr
es
su
re
 g
ra
di
en
t w
ill
 b
e 
ac
co
m
pa
ni
ed
 b
y 
fir
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s a
nd
 p
ot
en
tia
l f
or
 
se
ve
re
 st
or
m
s o
n 
Fr
id
ay
. B
liz
za
rd
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 w
ill
 b
e 
se
en
 a
cr
os
s m
uc
h 
of
 N
eb
ra
sk
a.
 
N
or
th
ea
st 
N
eb
ra
sk
a 
co
ul
d 
se
e 
ve
ry
 h
ea
vy
 sn
ow
, h
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 re
st 
of
 th
e 
CW
A
 c
ou
ld
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
po
ss
ib
le
 b
liz
za
rd
 c
on
di
tio
ns
. 
13
 
33
3 
B
W
-3
-1
4”
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
-2
-4
” 
w
ith
  
B
liz
za
rd
 
W
ar
ni
ng
, 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
 
Th
re
at
 o
f S
ev
er
e 
w
ea
th
er
 w
ill
 b
e 
he
re
 th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 th
e 
da
y.
 O
nc
e 
th
e 
ev
en
t t
ra
ns
iti
on
s t
o 
a 
w
in
te
r s
to
rm
, t
he
 h
ea
vi
es
t a
cc
um
ul
at
io
ns
 w
ill
 b
e 
in
 n
or
th
ea
st
 N
eb
ra
sk
a.
 T
he
re
 is
 st
ill
 n
ot
 
m
uc
h 
co
nf
id
en
ce
 a
bo
ut
 th
e 
fo
re
ca
st 
fo
r s
ou
th
ea
st
 N
eb
ra
sk
a.
 
13
 
15
59
 
W
S 
W
ar
ni
ng
-2
-4
” 
 
B
W
-3
-1
4”
 
W
W
A
-0
-2
” 
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
, B
W
, 
W
W
A
 
Se
ve
re
 st
or
m
s a
re
 st
ill
 li
ng
er
in
g 
in
 th
e 
Sn
ow
fa
ll 
am
ou
nt
s d
id
 tr
en
d 
up
 sl
ig
ht
ly
. V
is
ib
ili
ty
 is
 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 to
 d
ec
re
as
e 
ra
pi
dl
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 h
ig
h 
w
in
ds
 a
nd
 h
ea
vy
/b
lo
w
in
g 
sn
ow
.  
14
 
33
0 
W
S 
W
ar
ni
ng
-2
-5
” 
B
W
-4
-1
0”
 o
f a
dd
. 
ac
c.
 W
W
A
-2
-4
” 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
, B
W
, 
W
W
A
 
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
s h
av
e 
co
ol
ed
 d
ow
n 
m
or
e 
th
an
 e
xp
ec
te
d.
 T
he
re
 is
 a
 sl
ig
ht
 c
ha
nc
e 
of
 fr
ee
zi
ng
 
ra
in
 b
ut
 w
ill
 n
ot
 b
e 
a 
m
aj
or
 im
pa
ct
. C
ou
ld
 se
e 
w
in
ds
 g
us
tin
g 
up
 to
 5
0k
ts
. 
14
 
14
26
 
W
W
A
-1
-3
’  
B
W
-1
-3
” 
of
 
ad
di
tio
na
l s
no
w
 
B
W
, W
W
A
 
   
A
cc
um
ul
at
io
ns
 h
av
e 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
a 
bi
t d
ue
 to
 sl
ee
t t
ha
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
m
ix
ed
 in
 w
ith
 th
e 
sn
ow
 th
is
 
m
or
ni
ng
. W
in
ds
 a
re
 st
ill
 g
us
tin
g 
up
 to
 4
5m
ph
, m
ak
in
g 
ta
ki
ng
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
ts 
di
ffi
cu
lt.
 A
ll 
pr
ec
ip
ita
tio
n 
is 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 to
 e
nd
 o
n 
Su
nd
ay
 m
or
ni
ng
. 
 
Ta
bl
e 
4.
9:
 N
W
S 
H
as
tin
gs
 fo
re
ca
st
 fo
r t
he
 A
pr
il 
st
or
m
 
 D
at
e 
A
pr
il 
Ti
m
e 
U
TC
 
Fo
re
ca
ste
d 
Sn
ow
 T
ot
al
s 
W
at
ch
es
/W
ar
ni
ng
s 
Co
m
m
en
ts
 
8 
20
33
 
N
/A
 
N
o 
M
od
el
s a
re
 in
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t t
ha
t a
 c
lo
se
d 
lo
w
 w
ill
 e
nt
er
 th
e 
re
gi
on
 in
 th
e 
co
m
in
g 
w
ee
ke
nd
. H
ig
h 
w
in
ds
 m
ay
 b
rin
g 
fir
e 
w
ea
th
er
 im
pa
ct
s a
nd
 th
e 
sy
st
em
 m
ay
 b
rin
g 
sn
ow
. 
9 
 
20
58
 
N
/A
 
N
o 
Th
e 
sy
ste
m
 c
ou
ld
 b
rin
g 
th
un
de
rs
to
rm
s t
o 
th
e 
ar
ea
 T
hu
rs
da
y 
ni
gh
t. 
Th
er
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
co
ld
 a
ir 
ac
co
m
pa
ny
in
g 
th
is
 sy
st
em
 a
lo
ng
 w
ith
 th
e 
ch
an
ce
 o
f s
no
w
. T
he
 tr
ac
k 
is
 st
ill
 u
nc
er
ta
in
. 
10
  
21
20
 
N
/A
 
N
o 
Th
e 
sy
ste
m
 is
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 b
rin
g 
in
 re
la
tiv
el
y 
co
ld
 a
ir 
w
ith
 h
ig
hs
 o
nl
y 
re
ac
hi
ng
 th
e 
m
id
-2
0s
. 
Th
un
de
rs
to
rm
s a
re
 st
ill
 a
 th
re
at
 o
n 
Th
ur
sd
ay
 e
ve
ni
ng
. S
no
w
 w
ill
 ta
ke
 o
ve
r t
he
 C
W
A
 o
n 
Sa
tu
rd
ay
 
m
or
ni
ng
 b
ut
 h
ea
vy
 sn
ow
 w
ill
 b
e 
to
 th
e 
no
rth
. S
tro
ng
 w
in
ds
 w
ill
 a
lso
 o
cc
ur
 w
ith
 th
is
 st
or
m
. 
11
 
19
58
 
3-
5”
 w
ith
 a
 
lig
ht
 g
la
ze
 o
f 
ic
e 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
 
Th
er
e 
is
 m
en
tio
n 
of
 b
liz
za
rd
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
lo
w
. T
he
re
 a
re
 o
nl
y 
a 
fe
w
 in
ch
es
 o
f 
sn
ow
 fo
re
ca
ste
d,
 h
ow
ev
er
, w
ith
 w
in
ds
 g
us
tin
g 
up
 to
 5
0m
ph
, v
isi
bi
lit
y 
w
ill
 d
ec
re
as
e 
gr
ea
tly
. 
12
 
09
41
 
3-
6”
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
 
W
in
te
r s
to
rm
 to
 im
pa
ct
 th
e 
C
W
A
 F
rid
ay
 th
ro
ug
h 
Sa
tu
rd
ay
. S
tro
ng
 w
in
ds
 a
nd
 sn
ow
fa
ll 
ar
e 
th
e 
m
ai
n 
th
re
at
s. 
W
in
ds
 c
ou
ld
 g
us
t u
p 
to
 5
0m
ph
. T
he
 st
or
m
 tr
ac
k 
ha
s s
hi
fte
d 
sli
gh
tly
 so
ut
h 
so
 sn
ow
 
to
ta
ls 
fa
rth
er
 so
ut
h 
ha
ve
 in
cr
ea
se
d.
 
12
 
21
52
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
- 2
-5
” 
B
W
-4
-1
0”
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
ar
ni
ng
, B
W
 
C
yc
lo
ge
ne
si
s i
s o
cc
ur
rin
g 
ov
er
 C
ol
or
ad
o 
at
 th
is 
tim
e.
 T
he
 tr
ac
k 
ha
sn
’t 
sh
ift
ed
 m
uc
h 
an
d 
hi
gh
 
w
in
ds
 a
nd
 h
ea
vy
 sn
ow
 is
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
on
 F
rid
ay
 e
ve
ni
ng
 th
ro
ug
h 
Sa
tu
rd
ay
. T
hu
nd
er
sto
rm
s a
re
 
be
co
m
in
g 
le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 in
 th
e 
ar
ea
. 
13
 
10
39
 
W
W
A
-1
-3
” 
B
W
-2
-8
” 
W
W
A
, B
W
 
Th
er
e 
is
 a
 re
la
tiv
el
y 
tig
ht
 sn
ow
fa
ll 
gr
ad
ie
nt
 so
 a
ny
 m
in
or
 sh
ift
 to
 th
e 
tra
ck
 c
ou
ld
 c
ha
ng
e 
sn
ow
fa
ll 
to
ta
ls.
 W
in
ds
 w
ill
 b
e 
gu
st
in
g 
ov
er
 5
0m
ph
. t
he
 st
or
m
 sh
ou
ld
 d
iss
ip
at
e 
in
 th
e 
af
te
rn
oo
n 
on
 S
at
ur
da
y.
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20
51
 
B
W
-3
-7
” 
W
W
A
-1
-3
” 
B
W
, W
W
A
 
Th
e 
st
or
m
 is
 o
n 
th
e 
sa
le
 tr
ac
k 
an
d 
th
e 
sn
ow
 to
ta
ls 
ha
ve
 re
m
ai
ne
d 
th
e 
sa
m
e.
 W
in
ds
 w
ill
 in
cr
ea
se
 
to
ni
gh
t w
ith
 g
us
ts 
re
ac
hi
ng
 6
0m
ph
 in
 so
m
e 
ar
ea
s. 
Pl
en
ty
 o
f m
oi
st
ur
e 
in
 th
e 
at
m
os
ph
er
e 
so
 m
od
el
s 
ar
e 
in
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t a
bo
ut
 th
e 
sn
ow
fa
ll 
am
ou
nt
s. 
14
 
10
40
 
B
W
-1
-3
”,
 6
-9
” 
W
W
A
-1
-3
” 
w
ith
 li
gh
t i
ce
 
ac
cu
m
ul
at
io
ns
 
B
W
, W
W
A
 
Th
e 
m
os
t c
er
ta
in
 a
sp
ec
t o
f t
hi
s s
to
rm
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
th
e 
w
in
ds
. S
no
w
fa
ll 
to
ta
ls 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
di
ff
ic
ul
t t
o 
pr
ed
ic
t. 
B
ec
au
se
 o
f s
om
e 
en
tra
in
m
en
t o
f d
ry
 m
id
-le
ve
l a
ir,
 th
er
e 
is
 n
ow
 m
or
e 
of
 a
 c
ha
nc
e 
of
 a
 
w
in
try
 m
ix
 in
 so
m
e 
lo
ca
tio
ns
. S
no
w
 w
ill
 d
is
si
pa
te
 in
 th
e 
ev
en
in
g 
ho
ur
s. 
14
 
21
20
 
B
W
-a
dd
iti
on
al
 
sn
ow
fa
ll 
of
 2
” 
W
W
A
-
ad
di
tio
na
l 
sn
ow
fa
ll 
of
 1
” 
B
W
, W
W
A
 
A
t t
hi
s t
im
e,
 th
e 
in
te
ns
ity
 o
f t
he
 sn
ow
fa
ll 
is 
de
cr
ea
si
ng
 a
s t
he
 st
or
m
 tr
ac
ks
 e
as
t. 
Th
er
e 
is 
sti
ll 
po
te
nt
ia
l f
or
 b
lo
w
in
g 
sn
ow
 si
nc
e 
th
e 
w
in
ds
 a
re
 st
ill
 p
re
se
nt
. C
ol
d 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
s w
ill
 fo
llo
w
 th
is
 
sto
rm
. 
Ta
bl
e 
4.
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: N
W
S 
N
or
th
 P
la
tte
 fo
re
ca
st
 fo
r t
he
 A
pr
il 
st
or
m
 
 D
at
e 
A
pr
il 
Ti
m
e 
U
TC
 
Fo
re
ca
ste
d 
Sn
ow
 T
ot
al
s 
W
at
ch
es
/W
ar
ni
ng
s 
Co
m
m
en
ts
 
8 
20
40
 
N
/A
 
N
o 
Fo
r t
he
 w
ee
ke
nd
, t
he
 m
od
el
s a
re
 a
gr
ee
in
g 
th
at
 th
er
e 
is 
a 
di
st
ur
ba
nc
e 
co
m
in
g 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
ar
ea
. H
ig
h 
w
in
ds
 w
ill
 b
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 th
is
 d
is
tu
rb
an
ce
. R
ai
n 
w
ill
 c
ha
ng
e 
ov
er
 to
 sn
ow
 a
t s
om
e 
po
in
t o
n 
Fr
id
ay
. 
9 
 
21
25
 
2-
5”
 
N
o 
M
en
tio
n 
of
 li
gh
t a
cc
um
ul
at
in
g 
sn
ow
. H
ig
h 
w
in
ds
 a
re
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 a
ffe
ct
 th
e 
re
gi
on
. T
hi
s e
ve
nt
 w
ill
 
ta
ke
 p
la
ce
 o
n 
Fr
id
ay
 to
 S
at
ur
da
y 
af
te
rn
oo
n.
 
10
  
21
15
 
3-
6”
 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
 
A
 w
in
te
r s
to
rm
 is
 g
oi
ng
 to
 b
e 
m
ov
in
g 
in
to
 th
e 
re
gi
on
 o
n 
Th
ur
sd
ay
 u
nt
il 
la
te
 S
at
ur
da
y 
af
te
rn
oo
n.
 
Th
er
e 
is
 m
od
er
at
e 
co
nf
id
en
ce
 fo
r w
he
n 
th
e 
st
or
m
 w
ill
 im
pa
ct
 th
e 
ar
ea
 a
lo
ng
 w
ith
 th
e 
sn
ow
 to
ta
ls.
 
Th
er
e 
is
 m
uc
h 
hi
gh
er
 c
on
fid
en
ce
 w
ith
 th
e 
hi
gh
 w
in
ds
 th
at
 a
re
 p
re
di
ct
ed
. 
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21
16
 
3-
10
” 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
 
Po
te
nt
ia
l f
or
 b
liz
za
rd
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 d
ue
 to
 h
ig
h 
w
in
ds
. G
us
ts 
co
ul
d 
re
ac
h 
up
 to
 5
5m
ph
. C
on
fid
en
ce
 
w
ith
 sn
ow
 a
m
ou
nt
s i
s i
nc
re
as
in
g 
bu
t m
el
t o
n 
im
pa
ct
 c
ou
ld
 d
ec
re
as
e 
th
em
. T
he
 le
e-
sid
e 
cy
cl
on
e 
w
ill
 
de
ve
lo
p 
ov
er
 th
e 
Ro
ck
ie
s o
n 
Th
ur
sd
ay
 n
ig
ht
. 
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08
53
 
5-
14
” 
W
in
te
r S
to
rm
 
W
at
ch
 
Th
e 
w
in
te
r s
to
rm
 is
 n
ow
 a
 m
aj
or
 th
re
at
 to
 m
os
t o
f t
he
 C
W
A
 w
ith
 b
liz
za
rd
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 a
lm
os
t 
ce
rta
in
. T
he
re
 a
re
 o
nl
y 
m
in
or
 in
co
ns
ist
en
ci
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
m
od
el
s w
ith
 th
e 
lo
ca
tio
n,
 ti
m
in
g 
an
d 
str
en
gt
h.
 E
ve
n 
w
ith
 th
es
e 
in
co
ns
is
te
nc
ie
s, 
th
e 
fo
re
ca
st 
fo
r a
 c
rip
pl
in
g 
w
in
te
r s
to
rm
 is
 st
ro
ng
. 
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21
22
 
7-
17
” 
B
W
 
Th
er
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
a 
str
on
g 
fro
nt
og
en
es
is
 b
an
d 
se
t u
p 
ov
er
 p
ar
ts 
of
 th
e 
CW
A
. T
hi
s w
ill
 c
au
se
 h
ig
h 
sn
ow
 
ra
te
s. 
Th
e 
he
av
y 
sn
ow
 ra
te
s w
ill
 b
e 
ac
co
m
pa
ni
ed
 b
y 
ve
ry
 h
ig
h 
w
in
d 
gu
st
s. 
Th
e 
st
or
m
 w
ill
 st
ar
t t
o 
di
ss
ip
at
e 
on
 S
at
ur
da
y 
m
or
ni
ng
 
13
 
08
36
 
6-
15
” 
B
W
 
Th
er
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
so
m
e 
m
id
-le
ve
l i
ns
ta
bi
lit
y 
pr
es
en
t w
hi
ch
 m
ay
 p
ro
du
ce
 th
un
de
rs
to
rm
s. 
Th
e 
w
in
ds
 w
ill
 
sta
rt 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 a
s t
he
 d
ay
 g
oe
s o
n 
an
d 
th
e 
pr
ec
ip
ita
tio
n 
w
ill
 c
ha
ng
e 
ov
er
 to
 sn
ow
. P
re
ss
ur
e 
w
ill
 
sta
rt 
to
 ri
se
 th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 th
e 
da
y 
as
 th
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the area, due to the tight pressure gradient that models were predicting. Blizzard warnings 
were issued at 1600 UTC 12 April from both Sioux Falls and Omaha as a result of the 
combination of snow and high winds. North Platte and Hastings issued blizzard warning 
for parts of their CWA at 2200 UTC 12 April. The main impacts from the storm were 
expected to occur on 13 April to 14 April over the state of Nebraska. When the storm 
came through the area, the lowest pressure that was reached by the system was 988 hPa at 
0500 13 April (Figure 4.74) over west-central Kansas.  
The forecast for the April storm did not change too much over the 7 prior to the 
event and this can be seen in the NDOT-MDSS forecasted total snow accumulations. The 
evolution of the forecasted total snow accumulations for each route within the NDOT-
MDSS (Figure 4.75) shows slight variations as the storm moves toward Nebraska. Routes 
1, 2, 3, and 8, all had similar forecasts with Route 3 predicted to receive the highest total 
snowfall accumulation of approximately 25 cm. Route 6 and 7, also had very similar 
forecasts which is expected due to their similar geographic locations. The central part of 
Nebraska had the highest snowfall accumulation analysis and were well represented by 
the NDOT-MDSS forecasts.  
Routes 4 and 5, which run parallel to one another, had a much higher forecasted 
total snowfall accumulation than what actually occurred. Big decreases in forecasted total 
snowfall accumulation took place 18-12 hours prior to the end of the storm in each route. 
Route 4 saw a decrease of approximately 11 cm while Route 5 saw a decrease of 8.6 cm. 
Route 4 saw only 6.6 cm while Route 5 saw 10.7 cm. Since these routes are located 
parallel to each other, it is expected that they have the same or extremely similar 
forecasts. It was originally hypothesized that since the NDOT-MDSS, compaction, melt,  
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Figure 4.74: Mean sea level (MSL) pressure at 0500 UTC 13 April (SPC 2019) 
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and treatment are taken into account, that Interstate 80 (Route 5) would see less total 
snow accumulation than US-30 (Route 4) due to the higher LOS leading to more 
treatment; however, Interstate 80 actually saw the higher total snowfall amount of the two 
routes. With a difference of 4 cm, there may have been an error with the model within the 
NDOT-MDSS. The snowfall gradient was looked at to determine if there was an acute 
snow gradient in the area; however, there was no snow gradient that could have produced 
that much of a difference between the two routes. Route 4 saw only 3 hours of snowfall 
rates exceeding 0.75 cm hr-1 while Route 5 saw 6 hours exceeding that snowfall rate. The 
other routes had a relatively consistent forecast for total snowfall accumulation. All 
routes, with the exception of Route 6, did see a decrease in the forecasted total snowfall 
accumulation, although most decreases were minor. The reason for the decrease in 
Routes 4 and 5 does not appear to be a timing issue or an issue with the transition from 
rain to snow. The rain ended and transitioned to snow within an hour of when the NDOT-
MDSS forecasted it to. The snow rate decreased earlier than was expected. The heavier 
snow rates of over 0.75 cm hr-1 were forecasted to end at 1300 UTC 14 April; however, 
they ended at approximately 0700 UTC 14 April according the NDOT-MDSS. This 
would have led to decreasing snowfall totals in both of these routes.  
The snow starts in the far western part of the state within the NDOT-MDSS at 
1300 UTC 13 April while rain and thunderstorms occur elsewhere except the 
southeastern portion of the state (Figure 4.76). As the storm progresses, the 
thunderstorms start to dissipate around 1900 UTC 13 April and the rain changes over to 
snow. Heavy snow lingers in the northeastern region of Nebraska until approximately 
1600 UTC 15 April when all precipitation has ended across Nebraska. North central  
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Nebraska had the highest snowfall totals for this event (Figure 4.76). The analysis of 
conditions provided by the NDOT-MDSS have a good handle on the locations of 
precipitation and where the heaviest snow was occurring during the storm. With this 
storm, there was rain ahead of the snow so the road maintenance crews had to take that 
into account where they were pre-treating the roads. The treatment recommendations for 
the routes consisted of mostly patrolling areas and plowing them if necessary. 
The accuracy of the start time of an event is crucial to road maintenance crews for 
chemical application on the roadways. During the April storm, the NDOT-MDSS 
forecasted start times were within 5 hours of the NDOT-MDSS analysis of the start times 
in Routes 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 (Table 4.11). Routes 6 and 7 had 5-6 hours difference in their 
forecasted and their analysis of the start times within the NDOT-MDSS. The biggest 
difference was Route 1 with a 9 hour difference between the forecasted and the analysis 
of the start times within the NDOT-MDSS. When looking into a reason for why Route 1 
had such a large difference in comparison to the other routes, it was noted that the rain 
transitioned over to snow earlier than was predicted. The early transition led to a much 
earlier start times analyzed within the NDOT-MDSS than was forecasted. There does not 
appear to be a link to the geographic location with respect to the difference in start within 
the NDOT-MDSS. The NDOT-MDSS forecasted start time agreed well with the radar 
observed start times. The largest difference that occurred was in Route 8 with a 5 hour 
difference. Routes 1 and 2’s The NDOT-MDSS forecasted start time agreed perfectly 
with the radar observed start time. This result shows that the NDOT-MDSS did an 
acceptable job of predicting the onset of heavier snow for the April event with only 
moderate errors in Routes 6 and 7. The NDOT-MDSS analysis of the start times also 
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Table 4.11: Difference in precipitation start times for April Storm (Hrs) 
 NDOT-MDSS 
Forecasted vs. 
NDOT-MDSS 
Analysis  
NDOT-MDSS 
Forecasted vs. Radar 
Observed 
NDOT-MDSS 
Analysis vs. 
Radar Observed  
Route 1        +9.0            0.0 -9.0 
Route 2        +3.0            0.0 -3.0 
Route 3        +2.0           -2.5 -4.5 
Route 4        +3.0          +2.0 -1.0 
Route 5        +3.0          +2.0 -1.0 
Route 6        +6.0          +3.0 -3.0 
Route 7        +5.0          +4.5 -0.5 
Route 8        +4.0           -5.0 -9.0 
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agreed relatively well with the radar observed start times with the radar observed start 
times with the exception of Routes 1 and 8. Routes 1 and 8 both saw differences of 9 
hours. The NDOT-MDSS analysis of the storm starting much earlier than was observed 
by radar. All other routes had differences of less than 5 hours. Any differences in start 
times did not appear to have much relation to the geographic location of the route. Routes 
4 and 5 had the same analysis and forecasted start times within the NDOT-MDSS which 
is expected because they are so close together. 
The difference in end times was found between the same variables as the start 
times (Table 4.12). The accuracy of the forecasted end times within the NDOT-MDSS 
was comparable to the accuracy of the forecasted the NDOT-MDSS start times. Routes 1, 
2, and 3, located in eastern Nebraska, all had major issues with the NDOT-MDSS 
forecasted versus the NDOT-MDSS analysis of the end times. The differences were all 
over 5 hours. Routes 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 all had differences of 4 hours and under, which 
shows that there was a lot more accuracy with the forecast of end times with these routes. 
The reasoning behind the major differences observed in Routes 1, 2, and 3 were caused 
by the storm speeding up when it got to eastern Nebraska. The NDOT-MDSS forecasted 
that the end time would be much later than was actually reported by NDOT-MDSS, 
which is why an increase in speed of the system is expected to have occurred. An 
increase can also be seen when looking at the NDOT-MDSS forecasted versus radar 
observed end times. There is also a major difference in these variables in Routes 1, 2, 3 
and 8, which is also located more to the east than all other routes. The large differences 
between the NDOT-MDSS forecasted end times and radar observed end times shows that 
the NDOT-MDSS did not forecast the increase in speed of the system very well. The  
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Table 4.12: Difference in precipitation end times for April Storm (Hrs) 
 NDOT-MDSS 
Forecasted vs. 
NDOT-MDSS 
Analysis 
NDOT-MDSS 
Forecasted vs. Radar 
Observed 
NDOT-MDSS 
Analysis vs. Radar 
Observed  
Route 1        +9.0          +10.5           +1.5 
Route 2        +5.0          +14.0           +9.0 
Route 3        +9.0          +17.0           +8.0 
Route 4        +2.0              0.0            -2.0 
Route 5        +2.0              0.0            -2.0 
Route 6        +3.0              0.0            -3.0 
Route 7        +3.0            +3.5           +0.5 
Route 8        +1.0          +11.0         +10.0 
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differences for these routes ranged from 10.5 to 17 hours. This is a major inaccuracy. 
Routes 4, 5, 6 and 7 did not have any major differences between the NDOT-MDSS 
forecasted end times and radar observed end times, with Routes 4, 5, and 6 having no 
difference. The increase in speed of the system did not seem to affect the routes located 
to the west. While Routes 2, 3 and 8 all saw a large difference within the NDOT-MDSS 
analysis and radar observed end times, Route 1 only had a 1.5 hour difference. With all 4 
routes being located in the eastern part of the state, the differences should be relatively 
similar, yet Route 1 is very different. Light snow occurred in Routes 1, 2, 3, and 8. The 
snow ended earlier in Route 1. The NDOT-MDSS analysis of the end time aligned well 
for Routes 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7. The western and central routes were more accurately predicted 
than the eastern routes, which was most likely caused by the increase in the speed of the 
system as it approached eastern Nebraska. The difference in the speed could have also 
had an impact on the forecasted total snow accumulations in the eastern routes as well.  
During the April storm, Route 3, the route closest to the KLCG ASOS was once 
again the most agreeable with the data from the KLCG ASOS (Figure 4.77a). The route 
that had the least agreement with the data from the KLCG ASOS was Route 1 which is 
located to the southwest of the airport. Route 1 saw winds that were much lower than 
what was being reported by the KLCG ASOS. Route 2 followed the same overall pattern 
as Route 3 and the KLCG ASOS; however, the winds were lower during most hours. The 
KLCG ASOS reported wind gusts were surprisingly lower during most hours than all 
three routes. There was no pattern to which route had the highest wind gusts during the 
event. Hours 30 to 54 from the start of the storm, Route 2 generally had the highest wind 
gusts while Route 3 did a marginally better job of being in agreement with the KLCG  
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Figure 4.77: Sustained winds and wind gusts in the April storm. A) Route 1 (blue), Route 
2 (red), Route 3 (green), and KLCG ASOS station (black). B) Route 4 (blue), Route 5 
(red), KLBF ASOS station (black). C) Route 6 (blue), Route (7), and KBVN ASOS 
station (black). D) Route 8 (blue) and KANW ASOS station (black). The storm duration 
was plotted (light blue) to show when the storm was taking place per each route. 
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ASOS. The analysis from Routes 4 and 5 were in agreement within the NDOT-MDSS as 
well as with the ASOS station at KBLF (Figure 4.77b). There were no major differences 
in the sustained winds. From 9 to 17 hours out from the start of the storm, the KLBF 
ASOS was reporting considerably lower wind gusts than what was being outputted by the 
NDOT-MDSS in both Routes 4 and 5. Nine to ten hours after the storm started in 
Nebraska, the KLBF ASOS was reporting 7.5-9 m s-1 (14.6-17.5 kts) less than what the 
NDOT-MDSS was outputting. After this period, the wind gusts started to become more 
similar.  
The analysis of the winds by the NDOT MSS at Route 7 shows that there were 
many spikes in the winds; however, these spikes rarely were greater than the winds 
reported by the KANW ASOS station (Figure 4.77c). The analysis of the winds by the 
NDOT-MDSS at Route 6 show a smoother increase and decrease in the speeds in 
comparison to Route 7. There is one large spike that occurs at 40 hours from the start of 
the saved storm. The winds and gusts follow the same overall pattern although, during the 
storm, the winds seem to not be as in agreement as when the storm is over. From the 
beginning of the saved storm to 13 hours from the start of the saved storm, the winds 
reported by the KBVN ASOS station and the analysis of the winds by the NDOT-MDSS 
were in good agreement (Figure 4.77d). The NDOT-MDSS analysis of the winds and 
gusts in Route 8 then increases by a few m s-1 until 27 hours from the start of the saved 
storm. The KBVN winds increase to greater than the Route 8 wind speed. This occurs for 
a majority of the time the storm is occurring. At approximately 47 hours from the start of 
the saved storm, the winds and gusts from the two sources are much more in agreement 
until the end of the saved storm. During the storm, Route 1 saw a large decrease in the 
126 
 
winds and the KLCG ASOS station remained relatively constant while the storm was 
occurring. Other than Route 1’s decrease in wind speed, there were no other notable 
differences between when the storm was occurring and when it was not. 
During the April storm, the temperatures obtained from the KLCG ASOS station, 
Route 2 and Route 3 were all in agreement (Figure 4.78a). The temperatures in Route 1 
were slightly lower and had more erratic changes from 45 to 66 hours from the start of 
the storm. The reason for the differences in Route 1 is unknown. The temperatures for 
Routes 4 and 5 were almost perfectly in agreement with each other as well as the KLBF 
ASOS station (Figure 4.78b). There are only minor differences present. The air 
temperatures reported by the KANW ASOS station agreed very well with the analysis of 
the air temperature by the NDOT-MDSS (Figure 4.78c). There are only minimal 
differences, which is expected because of the proximity of the routes to the ASOS station. 
The analysis done by the NDOT-MDSS has the exact same pattern as the air temperature 
reported by the KBVN ASOS station; however, the air temperatures reported by the 
KBVN ASOS station was approximately 2-3 °C higher than the analysis of the air 
temperatures by the NDOT-MDSS (Figure 4.78d). The reason for the difference in the 
temperatures is unknown. During the duration of the storm, Route 1 saw an interesting 
pattern of small temperature spikes that were not in the other routes nor at the KLCG 
ASOS station. In all other routes in the April storm, there were no major differences that 
occurred while the storm was taking place. 
The pavement temperatures from Routes 1, 2, and 3 are in agreement during the 
April storm in the NDOT-MDSS, although pavement temperatures from Scriber peak 
10 °C higher than both routes 17-23 hours from the start of the storm (Figure 4.79a). This  
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Figure 4.78: Temperatures during the April storm. A) Route 1 (blue), Route 2 (red), 
Route 3 (green), and KLCG ASOS station (black). B) Route 4 (blue), Route 5 (red), 
KLBF ASOS station (black). C) Route 6 (blue), Route (7), and KANW ASOS station 
(black). D) Route 8 (blue) and KBVN ASOS station (black). The storm duration was 
plotted (light blue) to show when the storm was taking place per each route. 
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Figure 4.79: Pavement temperatures during the April storm. A) Route 1 (blue), Route 2 
(red), Route 3 (green), and Scribner RWIS station (black). B) Route 4 (blue), Route 5 
(red), and Wellfleet RWIS station (black). C) Route 6 (blue), Route (7), and North 
Thedford RWIS station (black). D) Route 8 (blue) and Cedar Rapids station (black). The 
storm duration was plotted (light blue) to show when the storm was taking place per each 
route. 
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could have been caused by the more southern location of the RWIS station. The 
pavement temperature in Routes 4 and 5 are very similar within the NDOT-MDSS 
(Figure 4.79b). The Wellfleet RWIS station pavement temperatures are slightly higher 
than both of the routes. This could be caused by the more southern location of the RWIS 
(Figure 3.2). The pavement temperature in Routes 6 and 7 within the NDOT-MDSS 
followed the pattern of the pavement temperatures of the North Thedford RWIS station 
relatively well (Figure 4.79c). There were a few areas of missing data from the RWIS 
station; however, most of the RWIS data saw the same peaks and dips as both routes. The 
inconsistency of the two routes and the RWIS station can most likely be attributed to the 
distance between them (Figure 3.2). Route 8’s pavement temperatures matched the Cedar 
Rapids RWIS station very well in the April storm (Figure 4.79d). The only small 
inconsistency is present at the very end of the storm from hours 63 to 66 from the start of 
the storm. The April pavement temperatures from all routes and all ASOS stations had no 
major differences from the normal pattern observed when the storm was occurring to 
when it was not. 
 During the April storm, the RWIS and ASOS station temperatures agreed very 
well in most geographic locations. The Scribner RWIS station spiked at approximately 15 
hours from the start of the storm while the KLCG ASOS temperature steadily decreased 
(Figure 4.80a).This was most likely caused by the more southern location of the Scribner 
RWIS station (Figure 3.2).The only other large difference occurred between the North 
Thedford RWIS station and the KBVN ASOS station (Figure 4.80c). Both stations have 
initial temperatures between 10-15 °C; however, the temperatures quickly diverge. The 
North Thedford RWIS reported much lower temperatures than what was being reported  
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Figure 4.80: Air temperatures during the April Storm. A) Scribner RWIS station (blue) 
and KLCG ASOS station (black). B) Wellfleet RWIS station (red) and KLBF ASOS 
station (black). C) North Thedford RWIS station (green) and KBVN ASOS station 
(black). D) Cedar Rapids RWIS station (magenta) and KANW ASOS station (black). 
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at the KBVN ASOS station. There was also missing data from the North Thedford RWIS 
so comparisons weren’t made from 21 to 35 hours from the start of the storm. The cause 
of the differences in temperature is unclear because there are varying distances between 
the stations and the routes (Figure 3.1), although the difference in temperatures should 
not be that much. The other ASOS and RWIS stations had very similar temperatures to 
one another. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
 
The January storm was a well forecasted storm as the storm got closer in both 
time and location; however, the forecasted low pressure center made major shifts due to a 
decrease in speed of the system prior to the event. The major shifts caused by a decrease 
in the speed of the system made the storm harder to forecast while it was still in the long-
term forecast range. Freezing rain remained in the forecast in the days leading up to the 
event so there was confidence in that aspect of the forecast. A winter storm watch was 
issued in all 4 CWAs at around 1000 UTC 19 January. Winter storm warnings, blizzard 
warnings and winter weather advisories were issued by all 4 NWS offices responsible for 
the study routes for the January storm (Figure 4.81). NWS North Platte put out both a 
winter storm warning and a blizzard warning for their CWA. The winter storm warned 
areas were expected to see 10-18 cm (4-7 in) while the blizzard warned areas were 
expected to see 20-30.5 cm (8-12 in). Routes 4, 5, 6 and 7, which are all located in the 
NWS North Platte CWA, were forecasted to receive a range of 17-26 cm, which is well 
agreed with the forecast put out by the NWS for total snowfall accumulation. Routes 1, 2,  
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Figure 4.81: NWS Blizzard Warnings (red), Winter Storm Warnings (pink) and Winter 
Weather Advisories (blue) from 0000 UTC 22 January to 0000 UTC 23 January  
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3 and 8, located in either the NWS Omaha/Valley or Sioux Falls CWA, were forecasted 
in the NDOT-MDSS to see 30-33 cm (11.8-13 in), which is on the high side in 
comparison to the NWS prediction. At the end of the January storm, total snowfall 
accumulation was recorded from the NDOT-MDSS for each route as well as data from 
xmACIS which is compiled of various CO-OP and CoCoRaHS stations for areas on or 
near the routes (Table 4.13). Routes 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 had differences of approximately 3 
cm between the NWS total snowfall accumulation and the NDOT-MDSS total snowfall 
accumulation. Routes 3, 7, and 8 were not quite as accurate with the difference between 
the two snowfall accumulation totals amounting to 9-17 cm (3.5-6.7 in). xmACIS 
reported much higher amounts in Routes 3 (17 cm more) and 7 (8.8 cm more) and the 
analysis by NDOT-MDSS had a much higher amount in Route 8 (11.5 cm more). The 
snow reports collected from xmACIS (2019) were generally not directly on the routes; 
however, they were in the close vicinity so this could have led to some slight 
inconsistencies in the total snowfall accumulations.  
The April storm was also a well forecasted storm, especially since the forecasted 
low pressure center is observed in the same location as was forecasted over the course of 
the few days prior to the storm impacting Nebraska. Heavy snow accumulations were 
predicted throughout Nebraska by each NWS office that contains a study route. Winter 
storm warnings, blizzard warnings and winter weather advisories were also issued by all 
4 NWS offices for the April storm (Figure 4.82). The NDOT-MDSS forecasts were saved 
approximately 20 hours at the most before the storm impacted any route so a long-term 
forecast was not available for comparison against the NWS long-term forecasts. Areas in 
the CWA of NWS North Platte were expected to receive anywhere from 15.2-38.1 cm at  
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Table 4.13: Observed total snowfall accumulations from xmACIS and the NDOT-MDSS 
analysis for each route in the study for the January storm. 
Route xmACIS Total 
Snowfall 
Accumulation 
(cm) 
NDOT-MDSS 
Total Snowfall 
Accumulation 
(cm) 
1 17.8 15.8 
2 17.8 17.0 
3 38.1 21.1 
4 26.7 23.9 
5 26.7 23.6 
6 26.7 26.2 
7 27.9 19.1 
8 10.1 21.6 
 
 
 
Figure 4.82: NWS Blizzard Warnings (red), Winter Storm Warnings (pink) and Winter 
Weather Advisories (blue) from 0000 UTC 14 April to 0000 UTC 15 April 
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2000 UTC 13 April, which was right before the beginning of the storm in the 
region. Within the NDOT-MDSS, the routes in the North Platte CWA had initial 
forecasted total snow accumulations ranging from approximately 21-24 cm and only had 
a Blizzard Warning put out. The NDOT-MDSS and NWS North Platte were very 
accurate with their range of total snowfall accumulations forecasted. NWS Omaha/Valley 
and NWS Sioux Falls had forecasted total snowfall accumulations ranging from 5.1-
38.1 cm which included a winter weather advisory, blizzard warning and winter storm 
warning. Routes located in the NWS Sioux Falls or the NWS Omaha/Valley CWA had 
initial forecasted total snowfall accumulations ranging from 14-22 cm within the NDOT-
MDSS. The range produced by the NDOT-MDSS was on the lower side of the NWS 
forecast. At the end of the April storm, both the NDOT-MDSS and the NWS along with 
various CO-OP and CoCoRaHS stations indicated totals snowfall accumulations for the 
event (Table 4.14). Total snowfall accumulation for all routes ranged from 3.1-25.4 cm. 
Most route’s NDOT-MDSS total snowfall accumulations were within 5.08 cm of the total 
snowfall accumulations that were observed on the ground, with the exception of Route 2 
which differed by 6.8 cm.  
Each storm had major impacts across the state of Nebraska. Whiteout conditions 
were observed due to high winds that were produced by a tight pressure gradient. A 
shortwave formed over the Pacific Ocean and then traveled across the Rocky Mountains. 
Both of these storms went through lee-side cyclogenesis as they crossed the mountain 
barrier. They are both classified as Colorado lows or lee-side cyclones. They had very 
similar tracks with the April storm being located a little farther to the northwest. The 
pressure gradients were approximately the same magnitude. April’s lowest pressure of  
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Table 4.14: Observed total snowfall accumulations from xmACIS and the NDOT-MDSS 
analysis for each route in the study for the April storm 
Route xmACIS 
Total 
Snowfall 
Accumulation 
(cm) 
NDOT-MDSS 
Total 
Snowfall 
Accumulation 
(cm) 
1 10.1 10.4 
2 3.1 9.9 
3 10.7 15.0 
4 7.6 6.6 
5 7.6 10.7 
6 24.0 26.7 
7 25.4 22.4 
8 5.1 7.9 
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the storm was 988 hPa while January’s lowest pressure was 996 hPa. The tightest part of 
the pressure gradient was located to the northwest of the center of the low pressure and 
situated over the state of Nebraska during each storm’s peak intensity. The placement of 
the tightest part of the gradient led to high winds, producing blizzard conditions 
throughout the state. Each storm produced snowfalls with large ranges within the state of 
Nebraska. The April storm saw severe weather ahead of the snow. Convection occurs 
more often ahead of winter storms that take place in the spring due to the warmer 
temperatures that are associated with spring weather.  
Although the two storms chosen for analysis are very similar, there are many 
different attributes present within them. The forecast for each storm had many challenges. 
The forecasted center of the low pressure for the January storm shifted from over the 
Great Lakes to over northwestern Kansas in the 7 days prior to the storm. The predicted 
location of the center of the center of the low pressure for April stayed in the same 
general area over western Iowa for the majority of the time starting at 7 days out. With 
the different locations of the low pressure centers for the storms, the predicted 
precipitation chances varied widely as well. The April storm took place overnight on 
14 April to the 15 April in the eastern routes. In the more western routes, the brunt of the 
storm took place from midday 14 April to the morning of 15 April. The storm lasted 
anywhere from approximately 27-36 hours in the selected study routes. The January 
storm took place overnight on 20 January to the evening of 21 January in the eastern 
routes. In the more western routes, the storm began around midday on 20 January and 
ended around midday on 22 January. The storm lasted anywhere from 20-30 hours for the 
eight routes. The April storm was a few hours longer than the January storm; however, 
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based on the NWS snowfall totals (Figures 4.1 and 4.42), this did not have that big of an 
impact on the total snowfall accumulation in Nebraska.  
 Freezing rain was seen in the January storm along the rain-snow line; however, 
the April storm had minimal to no freezing rain. The difference in the presence of 
freezing rain was mostly caused by a warmer layer in the atmosphere that allowed for 
partial melt of the ice crystals. The critical thicknesses at 2000 UTC 21 January were 
scattered across central Nebraska and were not completely in agreement. The surface and 
1000-850 hPa critical thicknesses are located farther to the north. The location of the 
critical thicknesses are an indicator that some layers over Nebraska were above freezing 
which led to the melting of ice crystals. Freezing rain and rain were seen across the state 
prior to the precipitation changing over to all snow. The critical thicknesses at 0600 UTC 
14 April were much more in agreement than the ones on 2000 UTC 21 January. As the 
storms progressed, the critical thickness lines move farther south, allowing for ice 
crystals to fall without melting in most of Nebraska. 
  Both of the storms had very similar characteristics of where rising motion was 
taking place. During the peak of the January storm, the center of the low pressure and the 
vorticity maximum was located over eastern Kansas. During the peak of the April storm, 
the center of the low pressure was also located in Kansas as was the center of vorticity, 
although it was slightly farther to the north than the January storm, crossing into 
Nebraska. The January storm had higher vorticity than the April storm so there was more 
rising motion associated with the January storm.  
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Chapter 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study provides insight into some the capabilities and limitations of the 
NDOT-MDSS based on data from two 2018 winter storms. The synoptic analysis of both 
storms shows how the storms compared and differed as events affecting the state of 
Nebraska. In addition, the two events are used as reference storms to evaluate how the 
NDOT-MDSS performed with different characteristics of the storms. The data collected 
from the NDOT-MDSS show the accuracies of the total snowfall accumulations, 
precipitation start and end times, and sustained winds and wind gusts of each storm. The 
results of this study provide valuable information to NDOT for use during winter events 
in the future. 
The January and April storms had very similar storm tracks in Nebraska based on 
the synoptic analysis even though the forecasted tracks of the center of the low pressure 
system varied widely. The forecast for the January storm had many major shifts to its 
track due to timing differences while the April storm’s forecast only had minor shifts. 
The center of the low pressure was located in slightly different locations during the peak 
intensity of the each storm which helped produce the different locations of heavy snow. 
Other variables contributed to the snowfall pattern as well, although both of these storms 
had similar intensities and values of the variables investigated in the study. The storms 
were very similar in overall structure and intensity. The impacts of both storms included 
road closures due to whiteout conditions caused by high winds and snow. 
The NDOT-MDSS has many positive attributes; however, there are a few 
inconsistences and potential errors in the system. There were variations in the total 
snowfall accumulation forecasts produced by the NDOT-MDSS based on geographic 
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location. The variations can be see when looking at how the forecasts of total snowfall 
accumulation changed throughout time and how each route compares to one another. 
During both the January and April storms, the routes located in eastern Nebraska always 
had an initial NDOT-MDSS total snowfall accumulation forecast that was much higher 
than what was observed. The accuracy of the initial total snowfall accumulation forecast 
also seems to have a geographic link, with the eastern Nebraska routes being more poorly 
predicted than the western routes within the NDOT-MDSS. The longer the forecasts, the 
greater the inconsistences were for the different regions. 
The forecasts for total snowfall accumulation for Routes 1, 2, and 3 were very 
similar. The routes all started out with a forecasted high total snowfall accumulations, 
then the accumulations decreased as the storm progressed eastward. These routes are all 
located in eastern Nebraska. Routes 4 and 5, located in close proximity to one another in 
southwest Nebraska, were in agreement with most variables investigated in this study. 
There were very little differences in the winds and the start and end times but during the 
April storm, the total snowfall accumulations differed by over 4 cm which probably 
should not happen due to the limited distance between the two routes. The January storm 
had no issues with the total snowfall accumulations for these two routes.  
The comparisons between the critical thickness values and precipitation types 
generated by the NDOT-MDSS showing the analysis of the conditions taking place at 
each route highlights the accuracy of the system in outputting the correct type of 
precipitation along with the rain-snow line. In each instant that was compared, the 
NDOT-MDSS had the rain-snow line in the correct place in the state. The freezing line 
was also used for verification since the critical thickness lines can sometimes be 
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marginally accurate and the NDOT-MDSS was also very skillful in matching the location 
of the freezing line. Freezing rain was forecasted by NWS for the January storm and the 
NDOT-MDSS did show this precipitation type occurring throughout the storm.  
Precipitation start and end times of the storms had varying accuracy for the routes. 
During both storms, Routes 1 and 3 had forecasting issues, although the NDOT-MDSS 
forecasted the January start times better than in April. The NDOT-MDSS forecasted the 
storm to begin both earlier and later than what was seen in the NDOT-MDSS analysis in 
January while it forecasted that the storm would begin later in every route in April. End 
times during the January storm were also better forecasted than the end times in April 
within the NDOT-MDSS. End times in January were forecasted to end earlier in every 
route by the NDOT-MDSS in comparison to the end time analysis while the storm was 
forecasted to end later in the April storm by the NDOT-MDSS in all routes. The NDOT-
MDSS had trouble with Routes 1, 2 and 3 during the April storm and 1, 7, and 8 during 
the January storm. The April storm saw a decrease in track speed which explains the 
timing issues with the April storm since the routes are all in the same geographic 
location. The routes with problems in the January storm are not in the same geographic 
group as one another so the issues seen in the forecast have an unknown cause. The start 
times, in most instances, were better forecasted than the end times in each storm. There 
were only a few considerable differences between the total snowfall accumulation 
analysis by the NDOT-MDSS and by xmACIS. The largest difference during the April 
storm occurred in Route 2 with a difference of 6.8 cm. The largest difference was much 
greater during the January storm with Routes 3, 7, and 8 all having over 9 cm of 
difference in the total snowfall accumulation output by the NDOT-MDSS and xmACIS. 
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The overall accuracy of the wind variables in the NDOT-MDSS were good. There were 
only minor inconsistencies, some of which could have been caused by the proximity of 
the route to the ASOS station. 
The temperatures outputted in the NDOT-MDSS during the January storm were 
generally less accurate than what was outputted in the April storm when compared to 
what was reported by the ASOS stations. Within the NDOT-MDSS, the temperatures 
outputted by the routes were very similar in the various geographic locations, especially 
in Routes 4 and 5. The NDOT-MDSS struggled to align with some of the larger 
temperature increases and decreases; however, it did do an acceptable job with matching 
the overall pattern of the temperatures being reported by the ASOS stations. The 
pavement temperatures in all routes were very accurate when compared to the RWIS 
station pavement temperatures. The biggest difference was seen between Routes 6 and 7 
and the North Thedford RWIS pavement temperatures. The North Thedford RWIS 
station pavement temperatures were consistently 3-4 °C lower than the pavement 
temperatures of both routes. Many of the inconsistencies seen between RWIS stations 
and routes may have been caused by the proximity of the routes to the RWIS stations 
because the RWIS stations are relatively scarce in Nebraska. The comparisons between 
RWIS and ASOS stations show that they have very similar patterns in most geographic 
groups, although there are a few times where one station would have a peak of warmer 
temperatures while the other station did not. Minor temperature differences were seen; 
however, some of these differences could have been caused by the small distance 
between the two stations. 
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Throughout this study, there were various limitations that could have impacted the 
results or hindered the project. This study had the intentions of also looking at how well 
the forecasts in the NDOT-MDSS did in comparison to what was observed. 
Unfortunately, there were not long-term forecasts in the saved storms within the NDOT-
MDSS, so it was not possible to see the long-term forecasting abilities of the NDOT-
MDSS. Short term forecasts are more valuable to the maintenance crews, although 
knowing what to expect more than 24 hours out does help them decide on how to better 
handle an event. Another limitation was that the NDOT-MDSS accounts for melt, 
compaction and treatment application which could have affected the total snowfall 
accumulation. This would have most likely decreased the amount of snow in the analysis 
by the NDOT-MDSS, so it may have caused a few inconsistencies between the snowfall 
observed by the CoCoRAHS and CO-OP sites compared to the NDOT-MDSS. In 
addition, another limitation of the NDOT-MDSS were decreasing total snowfall 
accumulations in the analysis of total snowfall accumulation by NDOT-MDSS in April at 
times that had already occurred. It was thought that warmer road temperatures during the 
April storm had caused this; however, according to the NDOT-MDSS, the road 
temperatures during the April storm were relatively close to those of the January storm, 
although the January storms had slightly lower temperatures in most cases. 
 Ongoing collaboration with NDOT for similar studies will help to increase 
confidence of results found in this study. Future studies will consist of looking at 
different storms, including Colorado Lows and Alberta Clippers. Combining future 
studies with this study will help NDOT better understand any inconsistences with the 
NDOT-MDSS and lead them to make improvements where necessary. The overall goals 
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of these studies are to help reduce road maintenance costs while increasing public safety 
during winter storms through the use of the NDOT-MDSS. 
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